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I. INTRODUCTION: LAWLESSNESS IN THE WORLD OF HUNTING
In this country, the tradition of wild game hunting is one that enthusiasts from
Maine consider "'older than voting."" For some, hunting is a magical season, and
the pleasure lies in experiencing the great outdoors and communing with nature.
Hunters often refer to a first hunt as a "rite of passage" and a male bonding
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, J.D., Creighton University School of Law;
LL.M., J.S.D., New York University School of Law. The author acknowledges the superb support
provided by Benjamin Capraro, Donald Renner III, Jennifer Karrels, Kelly Kubitz, and Christina Toto.
1. James Howard Kunstler, A Killing in Maine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at
60, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
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experience.2 Others are driven by competition and describe their joy in "[k]illing
the buck [deer] that you can really brag about."3 Some locales advocate hunting not
for the sake of the sport, but to curb the nuisance caused by wild animals in
populated areas.' Cities lament over skyrocketing deer herds that eat shrubs, cause
accidents, and spread Lyme disease.' Areas with these problems typically call upon
hunters to reduce the deer populations.'
Demographic shifts are increasingly turning rural farmland into an urban
landscape, thus reducing the span of open fields upon which hunters may roam.
Despite the obvious dangers of hunting in populated regions, hunters often use
high-powered guns with the capacity to kill or maim in these populated areas. In
some instances, this activity has devastating results for the innocent citizens living
there.
Careless hunters have shot household pets and farm animals, have sent bullets
into homes, and have caused property damage.7 Even worse, innocent people suffer
injuries and death from the wayward bullets of hunters.8 Although safety
regulations are in place, some hunters ignore the principles of target identification
and shoot at sound or movement, an easy way to mistake another hunter or
bystander for game.9 Mishandling firearms, failing to check the line of sight, and
"swinging on game," or otherwise becoming over-excited in the quest for game,'"
2. Jack Brubaker, In Increasingly Suburban Lancaster, Schools Replace the Hunting Holiday,
LANCASTER NEW ERA (Pa.), Nov. 23, 1999, Al 0, available at LEXIS, News Library, Newera File.
3. 20/20: Buck Fever, (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1990).
4. Roberta Scruggs, Urban Hunting; Archers Are Quietly Hunting Deer That Have Over-
populated Southern Maine, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), Sept. 17, 2000, at 14D, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Portps File.
5. Tom Cwynar, Downtown Deer, Missouri Department of Conservation, at
http://www.conservation.state.mo.us/conmag/1997/10/5.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2003).
6. Kevin Lynch, Deer Cull a Worry in Naperville, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2002, § 2, at 8, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File (calling on hunters to curb overpopulation); Julie Deardorff,
Wisconsin to Kill Deer by Thousands, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Chtrib File (to control chronic wasting disease); Scruggs, supra note 4, at 14D.
7. See, e.g., Justin Blum & Peter S. Goodman, Hunting Accidents Causing Concern; Falls from
Trees, Errant Shots Result in Injuries and Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1997, at B03, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (describing the situation where a hunter's bullet killed one man's
dog and injured two others); Hunter Accused of KillingHorse, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Dec. 5, 1997,
at 3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Miljnl File (discussing an instance where hunter mistakes
horse that twelve-year-old girl is riding for a deer and shoots horse to death); John M. Hoober III,
Hunter's Bullet Enters Kitchen, LANCASTERNEWERA (Pa.), Dec. 8, 1999, at B- 1, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Newera File (referring to a hunter's wayward bullet that entered a home and went
through two kitchen cabinets).
8. Kunstler, supra note 1, at 58.
9. See, e.g., Reid Magney, Onalaska Man Killed in Hunting Accident, LA CROSSE TRIBUNE (Wisc.),
Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.lacrossetribune.com/articles/2001/11/ll9/stories/news/lfatals.txt
(refering to a twenty-one-year-old Onalaskan man's death as an "accident" where the man's fourteen-year-old
brother's shot at movement killed him).
10. See Colorado Division of Wildlife, Firearm-Related Hunting Incidents Remained Low in 2001,
Colorado Department of Natural Resources (2002), at http'//www.dnr.state.co.us/news/press.asppressid=l 791
(last visited Aug. 31, 2004). The term "swinging on game" is used to depict the practice of hunters who follow
the path of game while continuously keeping the game in the sight of their firearms. This practice can lead to
shots fired in directions or areas in which the hunter may be unaware of the threat of danger to others.
[Vol. 56:135
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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF HUNTING "ACCIDENTS"
all contribute to hunting accidents.1" Most importantly, reckless shootings of
innocent persons that occur in the context of hunting are often declared an
"accident" and hunters are left unpunished or are dealt a mere slap on the wrist.'2
The purpose of this Article is to explore the lack of criminal prosecutions of
reckless shootings that occur in the context of hunting. This Article shows that
what some may write off as an "accident" is actually a crime, plain and simple. The
use of the term "incident" rather than "accident" emphasizes that a huge difference
exists between a true accident, as defined in law, and a so-called "accident," as
understood in the world of hunting.13
This Article does not advocate restrictive hunting laws or gun control. In
addition, this Article does not suggest the enactment of new criminal laws or
hunting regulations. Rather, the focus of this Article draws attention to a problem
that many may not know exists, and outlines the appropriate steps that prosecutors
should take to address the behavior of hunters who endanger human life and limb.
This Article demonstrates that prosecutors can rely on existing laws to bring
criminal charges against careless hunters.
II. TALES FROM THE KILLING FIELDS
On a clear November afternoon in 1988, two hunters in Bangor, Maine, parked
their pickup truck near a residential neighborhood. Don Rogerson, a local produce
manager and Boy Scout leader, and Peter Anderson, a Bangor lawyer, could not
have missed seeing the Wood family residence, painted white and standing only 319
feet away. Karen Ann Wood slipped on her dark blue coat and white mittens,
stepped outside into her backyard, and left her baby twins inside the house. She
headed in the direction of the hunters, likely in a attempt to warn the hunters that
they were too close to her home. Rogerson was equipped with a .30-06 mounted
rifle with a 4X power scope. Without a doe permit, the law required him to identify
his target as a deer with antlers, a buck. He fired two shots. One shot struck Karen
Ann Wood in the upper right chest, and she died within minutes. Although
Rogerson later claimed that he had a deer in his scope when he fired, an
investigating warden could not find any evidence indicating that a deer had been in
the area around the house. No evidence of deer body, blood, hair, droppings, and
tracks appeared in the vicinity of the shooting. Apparently, Rogerson mistook
Karen's white mittens for the tail of a deer when he fired. On December 5, 1988,
a Bangor grand jury's refusal to indict Mr. Rogerson for manslaughter forced
Karen's husband to resort to a wrongful-death civil action. He recovered
$122,000.1
4
Unfortunately, the type of carnage met by Karen Ann Wood is neither unique
to Maine nor an occurrence that happens only on rare occasions. Where hunting
occurs, these unfortunate incidents happen all too often.
1i. Id. (discussing fatalities caused by hunters who were "swinging on game" or running with
firearms).
12. See Hunting Accident Claims Man's Life; Pine Grove Township, THE MORNING CALL
(Allentown, Pa.), Nov. 16, 1999, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mmcll File; see also Ad
Crable, 4 Deer-Hunting Deaths in Penna.; 1 Countian Dies of Gunshot, 1 of Heart Attack; Another
Wounded, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Pa.), Dec. 1, 1999, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Newera File.
13. See infra Part V.A. (discussing the anomaly of the phrase "hunting accident").
14. Kunstler, supra note 1.
2004]
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Hunting is a popular endeavor in many states." According to a 1999 report,
"Pennsylvania is the nation's top hunting state, with about 1.1 million licensed
hunters."1 6 Pennsylvania also has a large number of hunting incidents.
After the first two days of Pennsylvania's 1998 deer season, a number of
hunting incidents already had occurred. For example, an eighteen year-old driver
involved in a hit-and-run accident in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, fled from police by
entering a wooded area. Shortly thereafter, an unidentified hunter hit him with a
buckshot. Authorities arrested the eighteen-year-old shooting victim.18 The next
day, a thirty-three-year-old man from McAdoo, Pennsylvania, was taken to the
hospital after being hit in the knee by a hunter's bullet.'9 Yet, despite eight deaths
and eighty-three injuries, one news report proclaimed 1998 to be a "relatively safe
hunting year" in Pennsylvania. In fact, 1998 was the third safest year on record"
(the worst year was 193 1, when seventy-two hunters were killed)."
With four fatalities and seventy-nine non-fatal hunting incidents, 1999 was the
safest year on record for Pennsylvania.2" But, again, it is useful to chronicle these
incidents. In November of 1999, a thirty-five-year-old Pennsylvania man was
unintentionally killed by a relative while hunting. The shooter thought the deceased
was making "animal-like movements." No charges were filed.2 Several other
incidents have occurred in Pennsylvania. That same month, a twenty-four-year-old
man from Ephrata, Pennsylvania, was struck in both feet by a rifle bullet as another
man shot at a deer.24 In McKean County, Pennsylvania, a hunter's shot "ricocheted
off a tree-stand" and hit another hunter in his thigh, causing a minor injury.2 5 A
thirteen-year-old boy from Alexandria, Pennsylvania, experienced a serious wound
after "bullet fragments from a stray shot" hit one of his ears. The shooter was not
found.26
15. Bill Stokes, The Guns of Autumn, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1991, § 10 (Magazine), at 18, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File ("[S]ome 16 million hunters take up weapons to kill birds
and animals...").
16. David O'Connor, East Earl Man Dies While Hunting Deer, LANCASTERNEW ERA (Pa.), Dec.
2, 1999, at BI, available at LEXIS, News Library, Newera File.
17. For the sake of brevity, this Article excludes hunting incidents that resulted in damage to
property or animals.
18. Boy, 12, Kills Dad in Hunting Accident; Columbia County Youngster Tripped, Fell on Gun
and Shot Father in Neck on 1st Day of Season, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Dec. 2, 1998,
at B2, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mmcll File (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Mike Sajna, Hunters Have Third-Safest Year in State History; Eight Fatalities and 83
Accidents Still Concern Game Commission, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 30, 1999, at C18,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Pstgaz File.
21. Id.; Pa. Game Commission, Hunting-Relaled Shooting Incidents Down, Fatals Up (May 21,
1999), available at http://www.pgc.state.pa.us/pgc/cwp/view.asp?A=l I &QUESTION ID=1600051
(last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
22. Pa. Game Commission, Hunting-Related Shooting Incidentsfrom 01/01/1999 to 12/31/1999,
at http://www.pgc.state.pa.us/pgc/cwp/view.asp?A=461 &QUESTIONI!D=158392 (last visited Sept.
30, 2004).
23. Hunting Accident Claims Man's Life; Pine Grove Township, supra note 12, at B3.
24. Crable, supra note 12, at A1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
[Vol. 56: 135
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These incidents are not limited to Pennsylvania and Maine." Across the
27. See, e.g., Accident Report Shows Errors of Deer Hunters' Ways, THE COUNTRY TODAY
(Wis.), Dec. 21, 1994, at B7 (recounting deer hunting incident in Wisconsin in 1994). The newspaper
report provided the following summaries:
-Chippewa County, fatality occurs Nov. 19,6:10 a.m. (before legal hunting
hours) when 15-year-old hunter on stand shoots at what he thought was sound of
running deer and hits first of three hunters in another party, walking single-file
along trail.
-Buffalo County, severe injury occurs Nov. 19, 6:15 a.m. (before legal
hunting hours) when disabled hunter in pickup truck fires at what he thought were
deer and strikes victim in same party, walking with two partners.
-- Outagamie County, minor injury (shotgun slug through upper thigh)
occurs Nov. 19, 11 a.m., when shooter who was driver fires two shots at deer and
strikes out-of-sight victim in same party. After being hit, victim fires three times
at deer, striking it twice.
-Marathon County, major injury occurs Nov. 19, 3:30 p.m., when hunter
shoots at victim kneeling in pine row watching for deer. Shooter said he thought
it was glistening hair of deer in pine trees 17 yards away.
-Calumet County, major injury occurs Nov. 19, 11:45 a.m., when two
shooters fire at four deer that ran between them and victim in their party, who was
struck after diving to ground 570 feet away.
-Green Lake County, fatality occurs Nov. 19, 1 p.m., when shooter who
was a driver fires at deer in cornfield, striking victim in his party who was beyond
target 9 feet above ground and 200 feet away
-Washburn County, fatality occurs Nov. 19,2 p.m., when two shooters fire
at deer that ran between them, striking victim in their party, who was 125 yards
away beyond target.
-Adams County, fatality occurs Nov. 20, 6:03 a.m. (before legal hours)
when shooter stumbles and falls, discharging gun with bullet striking partner
walking in front of him. Shooter had problem loading lever-action firearm, so
victim had loaded it, including putting a round in chamber.
-Buffalo County, major injury occurs Nov. 20, 10 a.m., when shooter fires
at deer that ran between him and out-of-sight victim in same party.
-Waupaca County, major injury occurs Nov. 20, 1 p.m., when standing
shooter on deer drive fires at deer that ran between him and victim in same party.
Shooter cited for use of illegal 00 buckshot.
-Sheboygan County fatality occurs Nov. 22, 12 p.m., when shooter who
was stander on drive fires two shots at deer in cornfield, striking victim in same
party about 90 yards away beyond deer, also shooting at deer. Victim found by
hunter while looking for deer.
-Columbia County, major injury occurs Nov. 24,9:31 a.m., when 17-year-
old shooter who was a driver fires three shots at deer that ran ahead of him in
cornfield, striking victim in his party who was beyond deer, 100 yards away.
-Taylor County, major injury occurs Nov. 25, 11:45 a.m., when shooter
fires at deer and strikes out-of-sight victim in same party who was beyond deer
and A-mile away.
-Rock County, fatality occurs Nov. 25, 4:45 p.m. (after legal hours) when
shooter walking in light cover on way to meet victim fires at deer and strikes out-
of-sight victim beyond deer, 158 feet away. Victim had wounded deer and was
5
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country, people young and old have fallen victim to careless hunters. A Glenview,
Illinois man shot his hunting partner in the face while pheasant hunting in Cherokee
County, Iowa. The victim suffered several severe gunshot wounds to the face, neck,
and upper body. Although the injured man did file a civil suit, a police report did
not indicate that criminal charges would be filed.2"
An eleven-year-old Weld County, Colorado boy sustained a critical injury after
his friend shot him in the head when they were hunting fowl. Authorities did not
file charges.29 A man in Gunnison County, Colorado, shot his thirteen-year-old son
in the face. Authorities investigated the shooting as a hunting "accident."3 o A fifty-
five-year-old hunter from Pueblo, Colorado, died of a gunshot wound to the torso
after someone kicked a loaded rifle that was resting on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV).
No charges were filed.3' A thirteen year-old hunter missed a deer and shot out his
aunt's eye while she was standing in front of her Osseo, Wisconsin home. The
district attorney decided not to initiate criminal proceedings.32
In addition to not being limited by geography, these incidents are not limited
by time; hunting incidents that do not lead to prosecution continue to occur year
after year. In November of 2001, a man in Springfield, Pennsylvania, died after a
bullet-fired by a hunter-came through the window, wall, and door of his house
and struck him. However, the district attorney decided not to file charges against
the hunter because a supervisor in the Pennsylvania Game Commission called the
incident "extremely strange."33 A month later, a man in Iowa died at the hands of
his hunting partner who shot at a deer that other members of the hunting party were
driving out of the woods. The shooter was only 125 yards from the victim, and the
shooter admitted that he had heart trouble and should not have been using a gun.
However, no charges followed "after a state investigation ruled the incident an
accident."34
In March of 2002, a hunter was killed in Vermont while hunting on a preserve
used for a private hunting operation. The owner of the preserve decided to visit the
victim with his all-terrain-vehicle, while another hunter rode on the back of the
ATV. When he met the victim, the passenger on the back of the ATV rested a rifle
on his lap that pointed in the victim's direction. After a brief conversation with the
coming up behind it.
-Jackson County, major injury occurs Nov. 26, 4:15 p.m., when 16-year-
old shooter fires two shots at deer, then trips and falls while looking for blood
trail, discharging Model 94 lever action and striking victim in same party.
-Green County, minor injury occurs Nov. 27, 2:45 p.m., when 15-year-old
shooter in a drive involving eight hunters fires at deer and slug fragment hits
victim in same party, about 60 feet away.
Id.
28. Robert C. Herguth, North Barrington Man Sues Hunting Partner over Injury, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Apr. 8, 1999, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chdly File.
29. Jason Blevins, Boy, I], Hurt in Hunting Accident. Rifle Shot Hits Youth in Head, THE DENV.
POST, Feb. 1, 1999, at B-02, available at LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File.
30. Nancy Lofholm & Erin Emery, Boy 13, Shot and Killed by Father While Hunting, DENV.
POST, Oct. 14, 1998, at B-06, available at LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File; Nancy Lofholm, Grand
Junction Teen's First Hunting Trip with Father Is His Last, DENV. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at B-04,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File.
31. Lofholm & Emery, supra note 30, at B-06; Lofholm, supra note 30, at B-04.
32. No Charges in Shooting Mishap, CHI. TRm., Feb. 4, 2000, at 3, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Chtrib File.
33. Bob Batz, Jr., Pa. Hunters Had Safest Year Ever in 2001, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr.
6, 2002, at D-3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Pstgaz File.
34. Mike Kilen,Accident Haunts Hunter, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 16, 2002, at 1 E, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Desreg File (emphasis added).
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victim about how his hunting was proceeding, the preserve owner started to leave.
As he accelerated the ATV, the gun in the rear passenger's lap went off and killed
the victim. Despite the fact that the rear passenger's rifle had misfired on several
occasions earlier that day, no charges were filed because police deemed the incident
an "accidental shooting resulting in death."35
This pattern continued into the fall 2002 hunting season. In November of 2002,
a seventeen-year-old hunter in Indiana suffered fatal wounds when his hunting
partner, another seventeen-year-old hunter, sat down to rest on a rock and
"accidentally" discharged his shotgun. No arrests or citations followed.36
In November of 2002, a forty-six-year-old hunter in New York was injured by
a bullet when his fifty-six-year-old hunting companion mistook him for a deer. No
charges ensued, but the police reported that the victim was not wearing hunter
orange.37
In December of 2002, a shotgun slug struck a fourteen-year-old hunter in Ohio
in the face when his thirteen-year-old hunting partner's shotgun, that had been
leaning against a tree, fell and discharged. The boy was in critical condition as of
December 9, 2002 and the Ross County Sheriff explained, "We really have two
victims here." No charges followed.3
In the fall 2003 and early 2004 hunting season, the same types of stories
surfaced. In report after report, whether the result was an inury or a fatality, the
damage had occurred during yet another "hunting accident.'
35. Eric Francis, Mishap Kills Hunter, RUTLAND HERALD (Vt)., Mar. 2, 2002, available at
http://rutlandherald.conlapps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?searchID=7318186500041 S&Avis=RH&Dato=200
20302&Kategori=NEWS&Lopenr-203020309&Ref=-AR&template=printart (emphasis added).
36. Teen Killed in Hunting Accident: Hunter Was Resting When Gun Discharged, Fatally
Wounding Other Teen from Martinsville, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 25, 2002, at 5B, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Indyst File. See also Hunting Accident Kills Largo Man, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Sept. 6, 2002, at 3B (reporting the fatal shotgun shooting of fifty-seven-year-old by his
daughter while the two were wild hog hunting was ruled an accident).
37. News Beat, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (N.Y.), Nov. 21, 2002, at 2B, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Rochdc File (discussing shooting of Gary P. Lyons, whose hunting partner shot
him in the back mistaking him for a deer). This article also reported that Santo J. Intravartolo, a
seventy-four-year-old hunter, was shot in the hip and hospitalized in November of 2002. He died two
months later while still in the hospital. Police initially charged his twenty-four-year-old hunting partner
with third-degree assault. Police did not comment on whether charges would change since the man died,
but an employee of the Monroe County Medical Examiner's Office reported that the case was being
handled as a possible homicide. Id. See also News Beat, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON.(N.Y.), Jan.
20, 2003, at IB, available at LEXIS, News Library, Rochdc File (discussing the fact that Santo J.
Intravartolo died two months later while still in the hospital suffering from a gunshot wound to his hip).
A subsequent LEXIS search revealed no information suggesting Intravartolo's shooter ever faced
prosecuted.
38. Holly Zachariah, Teen Hunter Critically Injured, COLUMBUs DISPATCH (Ohio), Dec. 9, 2002,
at IA, available at LEXIS, News Library, Coldis File.
39. The Tackle Box, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 1, 2004, at B2, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Newsdy File (reporting a "tragic hunting accident" where a Jacksonville, Florida man, who mistook
his teenage son for a wild boar, shot him to death); Law and Order, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 24, 2003, at
4, available at LEXIS, News Library, Tamtrb File (reporting on a thirteen-year-old Floridian who
"accidentally" shot and wounded two family members in a wild hog shooting incident); D'Arcy Egan,
Officials NoticeDeerHave BiggerAntlers, THE PLAINDEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 4,2003, at D7,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd File (reporting on several deer hunting "accident victims"
in Ohio); Hunter Is Accidentally Shot in Head, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2003, at B2, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (describing how a Westford, Massachusetts bear hunter was
"accidentally shot" and wounded by fellow hunter); Howie Carr, Tis the Season for Gun-Toting
Morons, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 30, 2003, at 16, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bherld File
(briefly describing fatal hunter shootings in New Hampshire, Alaska, North Carolina, Florida, Vermont,
2004]
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Even when prosecutors decide to press charges, sentencing is often lenient.
The following story is a typical example. In November of 1999, a twenty-one-year-
old man from Topeka, Kansas, and his friend were hunting at night, despite the
illegality of the practice. Moreover, they were hunting along a rural county road,
again, in spite of the illegality of the practice of "road-hunting." The two took turns
shooting the rifle and shining a spotlight into the fields. "Spotlighting" causes a
deer to freeze and is yet another offense.4" After spotlighting a deer, the shooter
climbed into the bed of the pickup truck to get a better view. The shooter lost his
balance and discharged his gun, shooting a sixteen-year-old truck passenger in the
head, killing her instantly. Police lodged charges of involuntary manslaughter due
to reckless conduct and conspiracy to commit criminal hunting. Following his
conviction, the shooter was sentenced. Although the offenses carried a maximum
sentence of thirty-one to thirty-four months, the judge exercised his discretion and
ordered a sentence of thirty days jail time and three years probation.41
In December of 2002, in Rhode Island, Robert F. King Jr. died when members
of his hunting party shot him in the upper back. King's hunting companions were
merely charged with the failure to render aid, driving a deer with a dog, and hunting
in a party of five or more people.42
Even more shocking, a man in Effingham County, Illinois, came forward after
headlines in the local newspapers depicted the shooting of a local judge as an
"'assassination attempt.""' The man confessed that he might have been the person
who shot the judge. He reported that he had lost a few ducks and believed that they
were killed by a predator. He saw a hawk on a nearby utility pole that he believed
had killed his ducks. He then borrowed a rifle and fired four shots at the hawk.
Wisconsin, and Iowa); Rachael Myer, Hunter Takes Son, 14, for Buck, Kills Him. Fatal Shot Fired
in Cleburne County on Regular Deer Season 's Last Day, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZE''rE, Dec. 30, 2003,
at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File (describing forty-seven-year-old man's fatal
shooting of his fourteen-year-old son in Arkansas while deer hunting with said death being the third
hunting fatality during Arkansas 2003 deer hunting season); Colleen Krantz, Friend Avoids Felony
Charge; Ballistic Tests Prove It Was a Breda Man's Shot That Accidentally Killed a Fellow Hunter,
DES MOINES REGISTER, Dee. 19, 2003, at IB, available at LEXIS, News Library, Desreg File
(reporting fatal shooting of a Sac County, Iowa coyote hunter, while he was seated in his pickup truck,
was "hunting accident" and that only charges against shooter who caused fatality will be for hunting
from a roadway); John Stith, Hunter Killed by Friend in Throop; Jerry Sylvester Was Named After His
Uncle. WhoAlso Was Killed by a Deer Hunter, THEPOST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Dec. 10, 2003,
at A 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Postst File (describing second fatal deer hunter shooting in
Cayuga County, New York, in two-week period; reporting five deer hunting fatalities in New York in
2001 and two in 2002); In Brief, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWs, Nov. 25, 2003, at B3, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Anchdn File (reporting fatal shooting of thirteen-year-old Alaska boy by his forty-eight
year-old father while deer hunting was "hunting accident"). See also Jonathon Briggs, Boy Killed in
Accident Apparently Did Not Have Hunting License; Ballo. County Child, 10, Shot Himself in Chest
with Crossbow, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, at 2B, available at LEXIS, News Library, Balsun File
(describing how ten-year-old boy, who had no hunting license, killed himself while deer hunting with
his father); Chris Guy, Charge Against Boy's Fatherls Set Aside in Bow-Hunting Death. In Exchange,
Man Writes Public Statement to Be Used to Promote Safety, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2004, at 2B, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Balsun File (reporting prosecutors dropped initial charges of reckless
endangerment against father often-year-old boy, who killed himself with crossbow while deer hunting
with his father).
40. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
41. Chris Grenz, Man Handed 30 Days in Shooting, TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL (Kan.), Nov. 3,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Topkcj File.
42. Tom Meade, Fatality Spurs DEMto Increase Patrols, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULLETIN (R.I.), Dec.
5, 2002, at C2, available at LEXIS, News Library, Prvjnl File.
43. John Husar, You Be the Judge: Are Hunting 'Accidents'Acceplable?, CHIi. TRIB., Jan. 19,
1995, § 4, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
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One shot hit the judge's garage, prompting the judge to walk outside to investigate.
Another shot that hit the hawk violated Illinois laws protecting bird of prey. A third
hit nothing, and the fourth bullet struck the judge, ripping "through his throat and
shoulder."" State conservation officer Jack Cohlmeyer ruled the incident an
"accident," while prosecutors simply charged the man with reckless conduct and
unlawful taking of a bird ofprey, both misdemeanors. The man was fined $200 and
placed on twelve months of supervision.4"
III. THE CULTURE
Many factors influence the decision of whether to prosecute a reckless hunter.
Sometimes the strongest objections against prosecution come from the victims
themselves. Debra Kelly, a woman from Osseo, Wisconsin, strongly objected to
pressing charges against her thirteen-year-old nephew who shot out her eye.
District attorney Peter Gierok commented, "Legally, it's not up to the victim to
decide, but considering how serious she was about this and that virtually nothing
would be gained by pressing charges, I decided not to file charges."46
Not all prosecutors are swayed by such opposition. District attorneys in Racine,
Wisconsin, charged Steven J. Johnson with felony reckless endangerment after he
shot a teenage boy through the legs. Johnson was prosecuted despite strong
objections from the victim's father, who also happened to be Johnson's hunting
partner that day.
4 7
Sometimes, a community sympathetic to hunters, rather than a victim, sways
prosecutors not to press charges and pursue violators. Such was the case with
Karen Ann Wood, whose fate was discussed earlier.
In the days following Karen's death, the newspaper columnists were quick to
defend Rogerson, who was a produce manager and Boy Scout leader. A local
columnist proclaimed that if Karen "had been wearing one piece of blaze-orange
clothing, she'd be alive today."48 The columnist, Tom Hennessey, defended this
statement by saying: "If she'd been killed out in her backyard by a limb falling out
of a tree, people would have said, 'Isn't that a terrible thing!'... But there would
have been nowhere near the response because of it being hunting-related." '49
However, Hennessy's comparison of this accidental shooting to a random act
of nature ignores the element of human recklessness that undeniably caused this
young woman's death. Hennessey's editor commented, "I think he was trying to
point out that the woman--even though she might have been on the edge of her
woods-put herself at risk by going into the woods dressed the way she was
dressed." ' Hennessey was not alone in his criticism of the victim. Another
columnist offered this opinion on the incident: "One guy goes out and makes a very
bad mistake; he shoots a woman who waves white gloves. She made a mistake! He
never should have shot at her, and she never should have had on white gloves to
wave."
5'
The issue of hunting safety has created bitter divisions among some
communities. Tensions increased when developers began building houses on
traditional hunting grounds, and the hunters refused to take their sport elsewhere.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. No Charges in Shooting Mishap, supra note 32, at 3.
47. Tom Ketcher, Man Charged with Felony for Shooting Teen in Hunting Accident; Boy, 15,
Was Shot Through Both Legs While Group Was Engaged in 'Deer Drive,' MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Jan. 20, 2000, at 3B, available at LEXIS, News Library, Miljnl File.
48. Kunstler, supra note 1, at 58.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Such was the case in Mississippi between so-called "deer-dog hunters" and
concerned residents.5" Deer-dog hunters use dogs to pick up a deer's scent. These
hunters release their dogs in areas where they have spotted deer tracks and the dogs
sniff out the deer while the hunters remain by their trucks and listen. Although the
deer are too fast for the dogs to catch, the dogs will flush the deer out of the woods
toward the waiting hunters. 3
Thoughts ofhunting consume the daily lives of deer-dog hunters. As described
by Jimmy Davis: "It's something you wait on all year long and it's almost like the
Super Bowl of our part of the year. Like opening morning, you don't [sic] any the
night before."5
Meanwhile, concerned parents teach safety to their children and restrict their
outdoor activities during deer-hunting season. Linda Williams, a mother of two,
talked about how deer hunters have affected her children. She said, "[m]y children
are literally animals in a cage during deer dog season."5"
Rules exist to keep the sport safe. Hunting at night, shooting on or across a
public road, and hunting on other people's land without permission are all
prohibited.56 However, some hunters openly disobey the rules and engage in "road
hunting,"57 where the hunters simply drive down roads, gaze into adjacent fields and
woods for their prey, and prepare to shoot from within or alongside their vehicles."8
Mississippi deer-dog road hunters park their cars on the side of the road and send
their dogs into the brush. They wait, often with beer in hand, until a dog flushes out
a deer. The dog then brings the deer across the road into the open area where the
hunter shoots it.
Virginia Breland, a retired teacher in Mississippi, understands the hazardous
nature of road hunting. She was driving along when a bullet hit her windshield.
She stated, "[t]hese hunters see a deer and that's all they see, so I doubt that he even
consciously saw the car. I think he saw the deer and he shot at the deer." 9
A local Mississippi farmer, Georgia Haas, also talked about road hunting: "I
have been shot at twice. Once, I don't know if they meant to hit me or if it was just
to scare me. I have chased [hunters] off my property .... They have blocked me
on my road and that is road hunting. "6o
As Haas's experience illustrates, trespassing is another problem rural residents
face where hunting is prevalent. For example, one Illinois man discussed how he
saved money all of his life in order to buy land, and he described how he worked
to turn the land into beautiful property with gardens and apple orchards only to have
the results of his labors destroyed by hunters who drove their vehicles over his
gardens, picked his apples, and trashed his property with beer cans.6
Robert McCormick, a Mississippi conservation officer, has the right to arrest
people who break the rules. While discussing dog hunting, he said, "In Vietnam,
I spent 12 months over there in combat. I've seen a lot of things over there that I
52. 20/20:Buck Fever, supra note 3.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id,
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., People v. Levens, 713 N.E.2d 1275 (1ll. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding conservation
officer's investigatory stop of vehicle after he reasonably believed defendant driver was engaged in
illegal road hunting after he observed defendant and his son traveling 10-20 miles per hour on a rural
road, both individuals were wearing hunter orange, the area was well known for deer hunting, and both
individuals were looking into adjacent fields where deer might be located).
59. 20/20:Buck Fever, supra note 3.
60. Id.
61. John Husar, Trespassing Knows No Bounds, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1986, § 4, at 8, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
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feared for my life more than I did in Vietnam." 62 He says drinking beer is a
problem, but that "buck fever," or hunters who get carried away, is even worse.
63
McCormick stated, "[w]hen they get excited and see that deer, then they lose all
conscious [sic] of what's going on."" Another problem is hunters who use CB
radios to warn each other of an officer's presence.6"
Even if McCormick does manage to arrest a violator, the judges generally let
them off. The problem is, at least in Mississippi, "anyone who's anyone here hunts
with dogs." '66 Presumably, this results in local judges who are sympathetic
towardshunters and who thus give hunters the feeling that they are somewhat
beyond the reach of the law.
Residents who speak out against reckless hunting practices often pay the price.
Electrical technician Bill Padgett was beaten after he told hunters not to hunt on
public roads. Padgett said:
The boy that hit me, his uncle was the foreman of the [grand] jury
and his friends was [sic] on the jury, so they didn't do anything
about it. The road hunter is outlaw. They run the country.
They're kin to everybody in the courts, in the game wardens and
everybody else down there.67
One local hunter responded to Mr. Padgett's fears by chiding: "What would
he [sic] done come wartime? If he's scared to ride down a road with ten guys
standing on it, what in the hell would he do in wartime?"6
When presented with the idea that dog hunting should be banned in the interest
of safety, another hunter replied:
Maybe we should stop selling cars. I've never seen anybody [sic]
or hunt around someone's property or home or shoot anybody's
vehicle or shoot at anybody's house. We've never had that
happen around here, with the exception of my brother getting
killed last year and that was a hunting accident.69
IV. STATISTICAL DATA REGARDING HUNTING
In 1996, of 201 million people in the United States aged sixteen and older, 14
million (seven percent) of them participated in hunting." Thirteen percent of
American males over sixteen and only one percent of American females in that age
category participated in hunting.7 Hunters are not a diverse group of Americans.
In fact, ninety-one percent of hunters are male, and ninety-five percent are white.72
62. 20/20:Buck Fever, supra note 3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 20/20: Buck Fever, supra note 3. See also Richard Larson, Watch Out, It 's Deer Season
Again, FREEPORTJ. STANDARD (Ill.), Dec. 1, 1988, at 12 (discussing how a Vietnam veteran compares
war with deer hunting and how he feels that deer should be trained to shoot back).
69. 20/20: Buck Fever, supra note 3.
70. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service & U.S. Department ofCommerce,
Bureau ofthe Census, 1996 National Survey ofFishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation,
at 22, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/fishing.html [hereinafter 1996 National
Survey].
71. Id. at29.
72. Id. at 29, 31.
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Hunters spend a substantial amount of time and money in pursuit of the sport.
In 1996, they spent 257 million days hunting, took 223 million hunting trips, and
spent 20.6 billion dollars on hunting-related equipment and activities. Most hunters,
11.3 million, were after big game, such as deer; a total of 6.9 million hunted small
game, such as squirrels and rabbits; 3.1 million hunted migratory birds; and 1.5
million hunted other prey.73
Hunters pursue their sport close to home and are evenly divided as to whether
they hunt on private or public lands. Ninety-five percent of all hunters hunt within
their state of residence, and fifty-one percent use private land exclusively."
Hunting tends to be concentrated more in certain geographical areas. A per-
capita survey of participation rates among hunters found the highest rate to be
fourteen percent, which occurred in the West North Central region of the country
(Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota)."
Based on raw numbers, Michigan, Texas, and Pennsylvania have the most hunters.77
No matter what their states of residence, hunters reside primarily outside the
nation's big cities. Forty-four percent live outside heavily populated Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs). Twenty-four percent are from MSAs of one million or
more. Nineteen percent are from medium MSAs, while thirteen percent come from
small MSAs.7"
Education levels among hunters vary, with fifty-six percent of hunters having
only a high school education or less.79 Twenty-two percent have one to three years
of college, twelve percent have four years of college, and ten percent have five or
more years of college."0
The annual income of hunters varies as well. Sixteen percent earn less than
$25,000; twenty-two percent earn at least $25,000 but less than $40,000; thirteen
percent earn at least $40,000 but less than $50,000; thirty percent earn at least
$50,000 but less than $100,000, and six percent earn $100,000 or more."'
While information pertaining to hunter demographics is easy to access,
obtaining accurate data pertaining to hunting accidents is almost impossible. State
departments, commonly known as Departments of Natural Resources, often track
hunting "accidents," but those departments have yet to compile that information to
produce a national survey. Members of Congress have proposed various bills and
amendments that would create a national clearinghouse for all gun accidents with
the hope that accurate information would lead to better gun legislation and hunting
regulations.8 2 To date, no such bill has passed. 3
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 27.
75. 1996 National Survey, supra note 70, at 27.
76. Id. at 66 tbl. 10.
77. Id. at 104 tbl.52.
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 31.
80. Id.
81. 1996 National Survey, supra note 70, at 27. Thirteen percent of survey respondents did not
report their incomes. Id.
82. E.g., 139 CONG. REC. 19,064-65 (1993) (providing a transcript of remarks by Representative
Patricia Schneder on the proposed Firearm Fatality Reporting System).
83. Perhaps blame lies with the gun industry and its allies in Congress. Congress voted to
withhold money and authority from federal agencies such as the Center for Disease Control and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission that can gather this type of data. Congress voted to "[d]eny
money to the [Center for Disease Control] to set up a comprehensive gun-injury data-collection system
similar to the one that monitors all car accidents." Henry Goldman, Gun Violence in the US. Costs
More Than $10 0 Billion a Year, BLOOMBERG NEWS (N.Y., N.Y.), Apr. 18,2000, available at LEXIS,
News library, Allbbn File.
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The International Hunter Education Association promotes hunter education
among the states. The group's website"4 provides an annual hunting incident
survey. The survey breaks down the incidents into fatal and non-fatal subgroups
and then analyzes the incidents according to the type of weapon used, the type of
animal hunted, the shooter's age, the shooter's skill and aptitude, safety or law
violations, and whether the victim wore blaze orange. Although comprehensive, the
data is difficult to use, because it tracks incidents for all of North America and does
not separate data that pertains solely to the United States."0 Furthermore, the states
of West Virginia and Alaska are not included in the survey, and the latter of those
two states has the highest hunting "accident" rate in the country.86
According to the International Hunter Education Association, 850 hunting
incidents resulting in injury occur in the United States in 2002, with 89 of these
incidents involving fatalities. 7 Yet, headlines from various newspapers suggest that
hunting is a safe sport both in and of itself and relative to other outdoor sports."t
Such articles typically cite the "'dark ages before hunter education' and show how
much safer the sport is today. 9 For example, The Christian Science Monitor
reports: "[I]n 1909.... 3,985 deer were harvested in Wisconsin and the same year
there were 44 fatal shootings, equating to about one human fatality for every 90
deer taken .... [I]n 1997, over 400,000 deer were shot by 700,000 hunters and
there was one human fatality." 9 However, in 2001, fatalities rose in Wisconsin
when seven hunters were killed in the deer hunting season that lasted nine days,9'
followed by one fatality in 200292 and two in 2003.93
Two grounds exist on which to criticize the conclusions drawn from these
statistics. In response to the assertion that "hunting is one of the safest recreational
activities," a simple comparison of the total number of injuries incurred per sport
per year is insufficient to support such a statement. Hunting is only a legal activity
in a given state for a limited number of days per year depending on the animal being
hunted, while most other leisure activities are not subject to such legal sanction.
Furthermore, no reliable national data on sports such as biking, boating, and
baseball reports time spent engaged in the activity and the number of participants
84. http://www.ihea.com.
85. See http://ihea.com/docs/IncidentReports I (Aug. 29, 2004).
86. Elizabeth Manning, Hunter Class Starts in '02; Rule to Cover Certain Areas, Will Aim to
Curb Gun Deaths, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2000, at Al.
87. See http://www.ihea.com/documents/ihea2002.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Basic Tips Keep Busy Season Safe, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 3,
2000 at 12D, available at LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd File (noting that "hunting is among the safest
of all outdoor recreation activities"); Skip Knowles, Hunting Has Become a Less Deadly Pastime;
Fewer Utah Hunters Killed Thanks to Education, Use of Orange Clothes, Smaller Herds; Hunting
Now a Safer Pastime-For Humans, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 20, 2000, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Sltrib File (quoting a state assistant hunter education coordinator as saying that "hunting
is safe and getting safer").
89. Todd Wilkinson, At Home with Guns, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 26, 1999, at II
(quoting Jim Posanitz, a hunting ethics lecturer, author, and organization founder).
90. Id.
91. Hunters Should Step up Safety; Fatalities: 7 Hunters Are Killed in Shooting Accidents in
Wisconsin's 9-Day Deer Hunting Season, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Dec. 2,2001, at 18A,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Telhld File (reporting seven fatalities out of a total of nineteen
"shooting-related" accidents) (emphasis added).
92. 1 Hunter Killed by Gunshot; Season Ranks Among Safest, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.),
Dec. 2,2002, at 2A (reporting one fatality in sixteen "shooting accidents" during nine-day deer season).
93. Meg Jones, State's Deer Season Tally for Hunters: 2 Killed, 13 Injured, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Wis.), Dee. 2, 2003, at 1 B, available at LEXIS, News Library, Miljnl File (reporting two
fatalities and thirteen injuries during nine-day deer season).
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in the activity.94 One must consider these factors when comparing hunting
accidents with other outdoor sporting activities.
A second criticism deals with the "hunting is getting safer all the time"
assertion. While specific numbers are difficult to find, some data suggests that the
number of hunters is declining, which would naturally result in a decrease in the
number of hunting accidents.95 One 1991 report explains that this change is due to
a society that is:
-Increasingly urbanized and therefore unfamiliar with Nature's
ways; [m]ade up of more fatherless households, where a hunting
tradition is not passed on;
-Developing a general hostility toward guns; [m]anipulated by
the emotional appeals of animal-rights activists; [i]mpatient with
boorish behavior in a shrinking outdoor recreational resource it
feels is monopolized by hunters; and [b]ecoming aware that
artificially high game populations-deer and geese for
example-turn hunts into bloody, mindless shoots.96
Another possible explanation is that, compared to yesteryear, young people today
have many more recreational alternatives, including surfing the internet or playing
soccer.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This Article does not recommend new laws for the prosecution of culpable
hunting incidents, but rather, demonstrates that laws already on the books provide
the necessary framework for this type of prosecution. Section A of this part will
debunk the notion that incidents where a hunter kills or maims someone are always
"accidents." Sections B and C examine of hunting regulations and relevant criminal
laws that may form the basis for the successful prosecution of reckless hunting.
Next, section D reveals an interesting phenomenon, namely, that outside the context
of hunting, prosecution does occur for reckless acts involving weapons. However,
section E points out that acts of recklessness associated with hunting are seldom
prosecuted. Section F stresses how reckless shooting should be prosecuted,
regardless of the setting, by offering case law that correctly combined the hunting
regulations and criminal law to actually prosecute culpable parties involved in
94. The Minnesota Star Tribune addressed this problem by putting forth a comparative analysis
for hunting accidents by measuring them on a "per million hunting days basis." See Dennis Anderson,
Hunting's Safe but Not Foolproof, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 12,1999, at I IC, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Strib File.
95. A 1996 Baltimore Sun article reports: "According to USFWS [United States Fish and
Wildlife Service] statistics, the number of people who hunt has been declining for more than a decade,
and hunter safety program leaders are looking for ways to encourage people to investigate hunting as
a form of recreation." The article goes on to blame single-parent families for the decreased interest in
hunting: "In those families, the dads might be inclined to enroll a junior in an [hunter] education
program,... But for most of the moms, guns of any kind are just bad news." Peter Baker, Improving
Perception, Safety on Agenda, BALT. SUN, Mar. 10, 1996, at 16D, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Balsun File (quoting an unnamed New Jersey educator). A 2003 Chicago Sun-Times article reported
that a USFWS survey revealed "13 million people age 16 and older said they hunted in 2001, a 7
percent drop from a 1991 survey." Ellyn Ferguson, Hunters Take Aim at Legal Restrictions, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at 31A, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chisun File; John Husar, Deer
Hunters a Vanishing Breed?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1992, § 4, at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Chtrib File.
96. Stokes, supra note 15, at 18.
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hunting incidents. Finally, section G briefly examines how other forms of reckless
conduct have become the focal point of prosecutorial authorities in the past decade
or two and asks why hunting should not also be similarly addressed.
A. The Anomaly of the Phrase "Hunting Accident"
To understand the anomaly of the phrase "hunting accident," one first must
understand the essential elements of criminal liability. All criminal offenses have
the basic elements of the actus reus (criminal act)97 and the mens rea (mental state)
although criminal offense without a particular mental state requirement is possible.
Absent a criminal act, a criminal mental state, such as bad thoughts or wrongful
intentions without any act to further them, is insufficient to amount to a crime. 99
Similarly, performance of a criminal act without the requisite intent is not a crime. "0
Various mental states are associated with criminal offenses; indeed, the federal code
uses more than seventy-five different terms to describe the mental elements of the
various federal criminal offenses."' Illinois, a state that followed the
recommendations of the Model Penal Code in standardizing the basic terms of mens
rea,'O2 defines, with respect to criminal offenses, four mental states: intent," 3
97. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-I (West 1993) ("A material element of every offense
is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender
and which he is physically capable of performing.").
98. Id at 5/4-9 ("Absolute Liability").
99. WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(b) (2d ed. 1986).
100. Note that in criminal law, strict liability or absolute liability crimes which do not require a
mental stateoccasionally appear. However, thejudiciary generally disfavors and most scholars criticize
these crimes. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)). See, e.g., Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Liability Without
Fault: A Disquieting Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1983) (discussing the "disquieting trend" of
increased judicial reliance on strict liability). Also, legislatures are not inclined to pass this type of law.
See, e.g., JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINALLAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES, § 2.42 (3d
ed. 2000) (recognizing the conclusion of Illinois courts that the legislative intent to create strict liability
crimes has been lacking).
101. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and the
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 125 (1980).
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1962) (defining the four kinds of culpability:
(1) purposely: when a person has a conscious objective to engage in the conduct of the offense or to
cause the result, or the person is aware of such circumstances of the offense or believes or hopes they
exist; (2) knowingly: when a person is aware that his conduct is a criminal offense or that such
circumstances exist, or he is aware of a practical certainty that his conduct will cause the criminal
offense; (3) recklessly: when a person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
a material element of the offense exists or is a likely result of his conduct; and (4) negligently: when
a person should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element of the offense
exists or is a likely result of his conduct).
103. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/4-4 (West 1993) (defining "intent" as when "[a] person
intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by
the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result
or engage in that conduct").
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knowledge," recklessness," 5 and negligence." °  Outside of absolute liability, a
defendant cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless he or she possesses
one of these mental states.7
In the context of hunting, what this Article calls hunting "incidents"' 8 are
almost always referred to as hunting "accidents.' ' 9 However, this term can be an
anomaly in the sense that the acts referred to as hunting "accidents" are not
accidents in the legal context. Frequently, these hunting incidents are classified as
"accidents," although a requisite mental state for a criminal offense does exist. For
example, if a hunter is consciously aware of the risk that he or she creates by
shooting in the direction of a sound, and if this act constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care expected of the reasonable person, then his or her conduct
is "reckless."' " Alternatively, if the hunter is not aware of the risk he or she creates
104. E.g., id. § 5/4-5 (defining "knowledge" as conscious awareness of at leasta substantial prob-
ability that a fact exists); DECKER, supra note 100, § 2.33 (providing that "knowledge involves the
following basic elements: (1) conscious awareness of (2) the existence of facts with a substantial
certainty and of (3) the results of conduct that are practically certain to be caused by that conduct").
105. E.g., id. § 5/4-6 (defining a "reckless" person as one who "consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the
statutes defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation").
106. E.g., id. § 5/4-7 (defining "negligence" as "when [a person] fails to be aware ofa substantial
and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining
the offense; and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care which a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation").
107. Id. § 5/4-3(a).
108. The term "incident" is used instead of accident to demonstrate that the legal significance of
the word "accident" is much different than common usage of the term. For example, it is not
uncommon in ordinary parlance to hear someone describe the likes of an "auto accident," immediately
followed by a statement that one of the drivers will be charged with reckless driving, drunk driving, or
vehicular homicide. If there was culpability, this was not a pure accident.
109. See, e.g., Husar, supra note 43, at 6:
Illinois, and I think all states, considers shooting accidents kind of an
acceptable thing, really," Cohlmeyer explained. "Look at the people who are shot
at fairly close range and no charges are ever filed. When hunters shoot at other
hunters, an element of risk is involved. There are a lot of cases where people
have been accidentally killed and nothing ever happened. There wasn't a county
attorney willing to file charges.
We consider running someone over with a car or otherwise doing something
dumb a serious matter, but we don't have that in wildlife law. While a hunting
accident often is a dumb thing, it seems to be acceptable. When I first came to
this job, we had a case where a fellow shot his buddy dead half an hourbefore the
season legally started. This guy was doing something illegal in the first place
when he had the accident. I thought surely we'd get him for reckless homicide
or at least reckless conduct, but he got offwithout anything. The county attorney
wouldn't touch it.
See also Magney, supra note 9 (referring to the death of a twenty-one-year-old Onalaskan man as an
"accident" when the man was shot by his brother, a fourteen-year-old, who was shooting at movement
that turned out to be the deceased); Colorado Division of Wildlife, supra note 10 (referring to deaths
involved in hunting as both "incidents" and "accidents" interchangeably).
110. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-6 (West 1993). See also State v. Perfetto, 424 A.2d
1095, 1098 (Me. 1981) ("In the context ofa homicide charge, recklessness is the actor's conscious
disregard of a risk that his conduct will cause the death of a human being.").
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by shooting at mere movement of a bush, and if a reasonable person should have
been aware of the danger involved, then he or she is "negligent." '
The mens rea of a criminal offense attempts to defeat a defense claim of
accident. In the legal context, an "accident" is defined as "[a]n unintended and
unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course
of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated."' " An accident can be either
a "culpable accident" or an "unavoidable accident," the difference being that a
culpable accident is not a defense to a charge, whereas an unavoidable accident is
a valid defense to liability in civil and criminal cases." 3 Court interpretations have
distinguished these two types of accidents. An otherwise criminal act will be
considered an accident where the actor acted without the required mental state-as
is the case of an unavoidable accident-whereupon the defendant will be relieved
of liability."14 Thus, a true accident is absent of all mental states associated with an
offense.' '5 If such mental states are present, a court will not recognize an accident
defense-as is the case of a killing that involves "culpable negligence," defined as
"something more than ordinary negligence."" 6 Prosecutors must separate incidents
involving recklessness or criminal negligence from the truly non-culpable accidents
and prosecute the former in the same manner as any other crime.
Similar to a claim of accident, the defense of "mistake of fact" may negate the
requisite mental state necessary for a crime as long as the mistake is genuine" 7 and
111. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-6. See also Perfetto, 424 A.2d at 1098 ("In the
[hunting] context, criminal negligence is the actor's failure to be aware of a risk that his conduct will
cause the death of a human being.").
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 15 (17th ed. 1999).
113. Id. (defining "culpable accident" as "[a]n accident due to negligence," which is no defense
except to those crimes that exclusively require wrongful intent as the basis for liability, and
"unavoidable accident" as an accident that "cannot be avoided because it is produced by an irresistible
physical cause that cannot be prevented by human skill or reasonable foresight"). For a case involving
civil liability, see Ohio Hardware Mul. Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 196 S.E. 915, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938),
relieving liability of an insured to pay premiums when a storm blew off a roof which knocked over a
telephone onto his car; ruling it to be an "act of God," which had no human agency as its cause. For
a case involving criminal liability, see Dennis v. State, 556 P.2d 617, 621 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976),
where the court reversed a second-degree conviction due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
on "excusable homicide," which is "a homicide committed by accident and misfortune in doing any
lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent."
114. See People v. Carlton, 326 N.E.2d 100, 104 (I1. App. Ct. 1975) ("An act that is committed
accidentally does not involve a mental state cognizable [under the law]."). Where, defendant had a
reckless state of mind sufficient for involuntary manslaughter and, as such, the court rejected
defendant's claim that a shooting that occurred in an apartment building was an accident.
115. See Dennis, 556 P.2d at 621 ("excusable homicide" means death occurred as result of an
"accident," which itself requires absence of criminal intent).
116. People v. Joyce, 84 N.Y.S.2d 238, 242 (N.Y. County Ct. 1948) (stating that one's killing
of another "is excusable... if the homicide is committed by accident or misfortune in doing a lawful
act by lawful means, with ordinary caution, without unlawful intent. * * * 'Ordinary caution' must
mean the absence of culpable negligence .. ") See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text for
discussion of this case. See also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 597 A.2d 690, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(ruling defense of accident inapplicable where defendant claimed that the shooting of his was
unintentional, because the conduct nevertheless involved the mental state of recklessness). See infra
notes 195-98 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of this case.
117. See CHARLES E. ToRCIA, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 76 (14th ed. 1978):
[A] defendant is not guilty of larceny for taking the property of another if he
mistakenly believed that the property was his own or was abandoned; a defendant
is not guilty of perjury if he took the false oath under advice of counsel and
mistakenly believed that the statement was true; and a defendant is not guilty of
resisting an officer if he mistakenly believed that the officer was a private person.
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the belief was reasonable.' The classic example used in many law school classes
on criminal law illustrates the mistake of fact defense. If an accused walked out of
a restaurant carrying away an umbrella that he honestly and reasonably believed to
be his own, he could not be convicted of larceny because his mistake of fact negated
the requisite mens rea of larceny, namely, intent to steal.1 9 Applying this reasoning
to hunting, a hunter who mistook another hunter for his hunting prey and shot the
second hunter would have the benefit of a mistake of fact defense on the theory that
his mistake negated the requisite mental state of a chargeable crime, but only if the
first hunter's mistake was reasonable. 2 ' Thus, in a case where a defendant fatally
shot a hunting companion in the mistaken belief that the victim was a turkey, the
shooting "was due to his own fault in taking an unsafe shot under unsafe conditions
at a target that he had not positively identified as legal game," and, as such, the
court rejected the defendant's mistake of fact claim.'
In addition, many courts have taken the position that the mistake of fact defense
may only apply if the mental state contained in the offense requires conscious
awareness of the dangers that flow from one's conduct. This state of mind is an
element of intent, knowledge, or recklessness, but not negligence. 2 Because
negligence involves inadvertent risk creation (i.e., one should have been aware of
the dangers of one's conduct but was not), "[i]n criminal negligence cases, the
emphasis is on the conduct, not the actor's state of mind.""' In other words, if the
theory behind the mistake of fact defense is that it negates the possibility that the
accused had a guilty mind, mistake as a defense cannot have any operable effect
where the underlying crime-an offense requiring only negligence-does not
require proof of a guilty mind or subjective awareness of wrongdoing. Thus, in a
case involving charges of "negligent operation of a dangerous weapon" arising out
of a hunting incident that resulted in injury to another hunter, the appellate court
said that because the defendant's "subjective state of mind is not essential to the
crime... he cannot assert the defense .... 124
Finally, an elementary tenet of substantive criminal law is that the victim's
contributory negligence is no defense to a crime.'25 Thus, the fact that a hunter's
companion wore a black jacket instead of a bright color, was intoxicated, and was
far from the spot where he was supposed to be when the hunter mistook him for a
bear, would not free the hunter from possible criminal liability. 2 6 Consequently,
118. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1046 (3d ed. 1986) (ex-
plaining that, generally, a mistake must be genuine and reasonable); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 12.03(D)(1) (3d ed. 2001) (noting that unless the offense requires
specific intent, the mistake must be reasonable).
119. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE,CRIMINALLAw § 5.6(a) (4th ed. 2003) (providing that common law
larceny requires an intent to steal).
120. Hines v. State, 578 S.E.2d 868, 873 (Ga. 2003) ("Generally, however, 'ignorance or mistake
of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only if it is not superinduced by the fault or negligence
of the party doing the wrongful act. "') (quoting Crawford v. State, 480 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 1997)).
121. Id. (upholding a felony-murder conviction arising out of predicate felony of possession of
firearm by felon).
122. DRESSLER,supra note 118, at § 12.03(D)(1) (3d. ed. 2001) ("[T]he mistake-of-fact ruleper-
mits conviction and punishment of a negligent wrongdoer as if he were guilty of intentional
wrongdoing.").
123. State v. Lindvig, 555 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Id. (affirming the conviction). Accord State v. Low, 635 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1993) (rejecting
mistake of fact as defense where defendant mistook victim for a deer, fatally killing victim, and
affirming defendant's conviction of "negligent homicide").
125. PERKINS& BOYCE, supra note 118, at 1086-87.
126. See, e.g., State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54, 59-60 (Minn. 1979) (upholding a reckless hunter's
second-degree manslaughter conviction, but stating: "It is well settled that the contributory negligence
of the victim is never a defense to a criminal prosecution.").
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the fact that Karen Ann Wood failed to wear hunter orange as she walked near her
home the day she was shot and killed in her backyard could not be a basis for
shifting legal responsibility to Karen Ann Wood.'27
B. Hunting Regulations: Developing the Standard of Care for Hunters
The analysis of the laws governing hunting begins with an examination of
hunting regulations. Each state possesses its own regulations that set out the
guidelines for hunting in the state. Hunting regulations cover a range of concerns
including the time period of the hunting season, prohibitions of certain conduct
involving hunting, age and licensing requirements, and the standards of care
required of those who hunt game and wildlife.' Violations of these hunting
regulations seldom constitute a specific criminal offense aimed at irresponsible
hunting, but instead, usually are civil in nature and are punishable by fine and
possible revocation of a hunting license.'29 However, hunting regulations are vital
to the thesis of this Article, because they set the standard of care for hunters. Most
life-threatening hunting incidents result from conduct that violates hunting
regulations. In these instances, the prosecutor can develop a case by comparing the
conduct of the defendant to the standard of care defined by the hunting regulations.
Every state requires hunters to possess a hunting license 130 and prohibits
hunting other than "in season.'' All states except Alaska require, as a prerequisite
to the granting of a hunting license, some form of hunter education, typically classes
that cover the general rules of conduct for hunting for people born after a certain
date. '2 Hunters learn: they must never point a muzzle at someone, they must never
carry a gun when jumping, they must always clearly identify the target before firing
a weapon, and they must never shoot in the direction of mere movement or sound. '
These regulations outlaw activities such as: road hunting, 34 hunting near a building
without permission,' hunting while trespassing on another's property,' hunting
127. Id.
128. For a comprehensive listing of all state hunting regulations in the United State, see
http://hunting.about.com/library/weekly/blstate.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
129. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.345 (West 2004) (imposing a fine of not more than $50 and
possible revocation of a hunting license to any person involved in a hunting accident who fails to report
the accident in which a person was injured by a discharge of a firearm or other weapon).
130. E.g., id. § 29.164; 520 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.2d (West 2004).
131. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.02 (2001); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.25 (West
2004).
132. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.025 (Supp. 2004); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.2 (West
2004).
133. A description of a mandatory hunter education program is available on the Iowa Department
of Natural Resources' website. Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Iowa Department of Natural
Resources HunterEducation Program, at http://www.iowadnr.com/law/hunter/index.htl (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004) (stating that the hunter education program "is designed to introduce students to several
life-long skills that are important to the many different types of outdoor recreational opportunities. The
course teaches students basic survival and first aid skills, water safety, wildlife identification, and the
basics of wildlife management, hunting laws, and firearm/archery safety. Hunter education also stresses
the importance of individual responsibility and outdoor ethics.").
134. E.g., West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, General Hunting Laws &
Regulations, at www.wvdnr.gov/Hunting/Laws.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); 520 ILL CoMp. STAT.
ANN. 5/2.31 (West 2004) (outlawing taking wildlife "along, upon, across, or from any public right-of-
way or highway").
135. E.g., Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Iowa Hunting, Fishing and Trapping
Regulations, available at http://www.iowadnr.comlaw/regs.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Iowa
hunting regulations prevent any hunter from discharging a firearm within 200 yards of any building that
houses people or livestock or a feedlot without the owner's consent. Id. at 12. See also 520 ILL. COMp.
2004]
19
Decker: Don't Forget to Wear Your Hunter Orange (or Flack Jacket): A Crit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
without wearing hunter orange,1" and, at least in some states, hunting with certain
types of weapons.' Most states also have various laws to protect endangered
species."'
Some states have gone beyond merely issuing fines, criminalizing various
hunting regulation violations that involve unusually high risks. These violations
include hunting near a dwelling, 4 ' hunting at night,' "road-hunting, "4 and
"spotlighting."F4 3 Beyond the laws designed to prevent hazardous hunting, some
states have chosen to codify crimes and defenses specifically dealing with careless
hunting incidents that occur.
For example, in Minnesota, a person who causes the death of another by
shooting the victim with a firearm or other dangerous weapon, while negligently
believing the person to be a deer or other animal, is guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree'" In Pennsylvania, a criminal prohibition specifically outlaws "any
person while hunting" from carelessly or negligently shooting at, injuring, or killing
STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(u) (West 2004) (prohibiting hunting within 300 yards of dwelling unless with
permission).
136. E.g., 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(t) (West 2004). This misconduct poses a huge
problem for landowners. It may also include a hunter's release of dogs onto a property owner's land,
where the canines are employed to scare wildlife outside the property to waiting hunters. See, e.g.,
Pegg v. Gray, 82 S.E.2d 757 (N.C. 1954) (allowing civil action for alleged trespass where dog owner
released foxhounds onto defendant's property in pursuit of game). The proclivity of some hunters to
trespass is only encouraged in jurisdictions with an affirmative defense which allows hunters to enter
unposted agricultural land to pursue wounded animals, such as deer, even if the landowner objects. See,
e.g., State v. Corbin, 343 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing such statutory defense). But
cf State v. Rumpca, 652 N.W.2d 795 (S.D. 2002) (disallowing such practice if landowner objects).
In the author's experience, this exemption often proves to be a handy excuse for a hunter not in pursuit
of wounded game to avoid a claim of trespass.
137. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.301(2) (West 2004) ("[N]o person may hunt any game except
waterfowl during that season unless at least 50% of each article of the person's clothing above the
waist... is ... hunter orange .... ); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(gg) (West 2004) ("It is
unlawful during the upland game season for any person to take upland game with a firearm unless he
or she wears, while in the field, a cap of solid blaze orange color.").
138. E.g., 520 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.25 (West 2004) ("It shall be unlawful for any person
to take deer except (i) with a shotgun, handgun, or muzzle loading rifle or (ii) as provided by
administrative rule, with a bow and arrow, or crossbow device for handicapped persons ....").
139. E.g., 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1-10/11 (West 2004) (Illinois Endangered Species
Protection Act).
140. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 481 A. 123 (West Supp. 2004) (prohibiting discharge of a firearm
"within two hundred yards of a building inhabited by people or dome stick livestock or within two
hundred yards of a feedlet unless the owner or tenant has given consent").
141. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.075 (West Supp. 2004).
142. E.g., id. § 97B.055 (preventing the discharge of a firearm "on, over, or across an improved
public highway at a big game animal").
143. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.314 (West 2004) (punishing violators with a fine of no less than
$1,000 and no more than $2,000 or imprisonment of no more than six months, revocation of a hunting
license, and a prevention of renewal for a period of three years). Spotlighting or "shining" is a term
used in hunting that depicts the night-time practice of some hunters to shine bright lights, such as the
headlights of a car, into an area where wildlife are located to temporarily blind an animal, such as a
deer, and cause it to freeze in its tracks so that the hunters may more easily shoot the wildlife.
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.205 (West Supp. 2003) (punishing those found guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree with no more than ten years imprisonment or with a fine of no more than
$20,000); see also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-6-122 (Lexis Nexis 2003) (punishing any person who
hunts in a careless manner or who discharges a firearm or releases an arrow in a careless manner that
endangers the lives of others with a fine of at least $100 but no more than $1,000, up to one year
imprisonment, or both).
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another human being. 41 In addition, some states have statutes requiring those
involved in a hunting incident to report the event to the proper authorities within a
specified time. The failure to do so may be punishable by a fine, suspension of the
violator's hunting license, or possible imprisonment. 46 For instance, Wisconsin
criminalizes the failure of the responsible party to report a shooting incident that
results in injury or death of another, 47 but the failure of a present party to report an
"accident" that involved injury to one's self or to another carries a monetary penalty
ofnot more than fifty dollars and the possible revocation of one's hunting license. "'
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania has specifically codified a defense for discharging a
firearm into an occupied structure. The defense applies if the person discharging
the firearm was hunting where hunting is lawful and if the discharge was not
"intentional, knowing[,] or reckless." '49 Some states have a hotline where tipsters
can report hunting violations they observe.5 ° In fact, in some states, a hotline
allows callers reporting hunting violations to receive a monetary reward."'
C. Possible Criminal Measures
Prosecutors can use multiple criminal offenses to prosecute criminal conduct
inherent in a hunting "incident." Many hunting incidents occur due to the
recklessness of the hunter or hunters involved. Most states either have specific or
general prohibitions to prosecute such careless behavior. Specific offenses include
negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon,' reckless discharge of a
firearm, 53 or reckless handling of a firearm."54  General prohibitions against
145. E.g., 34 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2522(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("It is unlawful for any person
while hunting or furtaking, through carelessness or negligence, to shoot at, injure or kill any human
being through the use of a firearm, bow and arrow or other deadly weapon.").
146. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 481A.18 (West 1997) (imposing a simple misdemeanor for the
failure to report a hunting accident by a person involved when injury or damage to property over $100
occurs).
147. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.341 (West 2004).
148. Id. § 29.345.
149. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2707.1 (West Supp. 2004).
150. See, e.g., Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, Report a Wildlife Violation,
http://www.dgif.state.va.us/info/wildlife-violations.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004)
(PARENTHETICAL?).
151. See, e.g., http://wdfw.wa.gov/enf/oaching.htm (showing that the Washington Department
of Fish and Wildlife offers a $50 reward for fish and $100 reward for wildlife);
http://www.state.nd.us/gnf/info/rapbrochure.html (showing that the North Dakota Game and Fish
Department offers rewards that range between $50 to $1000).
152. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.24(1) (West Supp. 2003) ("Whoever causes bodily harm to
another by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of
a... felony.").
153. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-106 (Lexis Nexis 2003) ("A person commits
a... misdemeanor if: (a)[h]He knowingly and unlawfully aims a firearm at another person; or (b)
[rlecklessly or with criminal negligence he discharges a firearm or shoots a bow and arrow; or (c) [hie
knowingly... leaves [a loaded gun] unattended... ; or (d) [t]he person has in his possession a firearm
while the person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a controlled substance ....").
154. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.230 (West 2003) ("[A]ny person who (a) [a]ims any
firearm, whether loaded or not, at or towards any human being; [or] (b) [w]illfully discharges any
firearm, air gun, or other weapon, or throws any deadly missile in a public place, or in any place where
any person might be endangered thereby .... ").
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reckless behavior include reckless conduct'55 and reckless endangerment.' The
more specific strictures may outlaw particular types of conduct such as "aiming" a
gun at another.'57 The more general statutes work in virtually the same way from
state to state, and they generally follow the theme of the Model Penal Code:
Recklessly Endangering Another Person: A person commits a
misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Recklessness and danger shall be presumed where a person knowingly
points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor
believed the firearm to be loaded. 5 '
The common denominator of all these offenses is the existence of a reckless state
of mind on the part of the offender. As stated earlier, recklessness is a conscious
disregard of a risk to life and limb which constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care expected of a reasonable person.'59
When death arises from the reckless taking of life, most states have involuntary
manslaughter to addresses this behavior.'60 Moreover, numerous jurisdictions are
willing to predicate manslaughter on a showing of criminal negligence, a mental
state distinct and more culpable than the ordinary negligence standard that gives rise
to civil liability.' According to the Model Penal Code definitions, the key
difference between recklessness and negligence is the presence of subjective
awareness of the risk one's conduct creates in the former and the absence of
subjective awareness of the risk that flows from one's conduct in the latter.162 In
other words, recklessness involves advertent risk creation and subjective fault while
negligence arises from inadvertent risk creation reflecting objective fault. '
63
155. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5 (a) (West 2001) ("A person who causes bodily
harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if he
performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endanger safety, whether they otherwise are
lawful or unlawful.").
156. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.050 (West 2000) ("(1) A person is guilty of reckless
endangerment when he or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that
creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. (2) Reckless
endangerment is a gross misdemeanor."). See also id. § 9A.36.045 (outlawing drive-by shooting).
157. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-106 (2003).
158. MODELPENALCODE § 211.2 (Official Draft 1962).
159. Id. § 2.02.(c).
160. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a) (West Supp. 2004):
A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification
commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which
cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some
individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause
of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile,
all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless
homicide.
161. PERKINS& BOYCE, supra note 118, at 105-08.
162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) ("A person acts recklessly... when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk....") (emphasis added). Cf id. § 2.02(2)(d) ("A person
acts negligently... when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk....") (emphasis
added).
163. Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ("At the heart of reckless
conduct is conscious disregard ofthe risk createdby the actor's conduct; the key to criminal negligence
is found in the failure of the actor to perceive the risk.") (quoting Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553
(Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
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The difference between criminal negligence and ordinary negligence, which
provides an injured party a right to civil damages, is found in the degree of
negligence involved. '" Ordinary negligence only requires proof of a failure to
exercise the care with which the ordinary reasonable person would have acted when
faced with certain circumstances while criminal negligence demands a showing of
a substantial65 or gross failure'66 to meet the norm expected of the reasonable
person in such circumstances. Thus, American criminal law ordinarily allows a
prosecution for manslaughter when an individual kills while harboring a reckless
state of mind' 7 or when an individual is criminally negligent.t" In case law, a
prosecution for manslaughter often requires a state of mind with a level of
culpability similar to recklessness and more serious than tort negligence.'69
The second approach used to establish involuntary manslaughter in many, but
not all jurisdictions, occurs when an individual engages in an unlawful act that
causes a serious threat to life or limb. 7 Generally referred to as "unlawful-act
involuntary manslaughter"'' or "unlawful-act manslaughter,"' 72 this approach to
unlawful homicide originated in the common law "misdemeanor-manslaughter rule"
(which it is still called in some circles), a companion of the felony-murder rule.'73
At common law, any unintended killing that occurred during the course of an
unlawful act, other than a felony which would trigger the felony-murder rule,
constituted involuntary manslaughter 4 Eventually, this law evolved, in the interest
of avoiding of harsh or illogical application where a death occurred during the
course of a non-life-threatening misdemeanor, to require at least two, if not three,
qualifications that the unlawful act had to satisfy before it triggered a finding of
164. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 118, at 107.
165. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-7 (2002) (noting that "failure constitutes a substantial
deviation" from the expected standard of care).
166. See MODELPENALCODE § 2.02(2)(d) (stating that failure constitutes a "gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation").
167. LAFAVE. supra note 119, § 15.4(a) (noting the "modem view," reflected in the Model Penal
Code and most recent codifications of state criminal law, requires conscious awareness of the risk or
recklessness for involuntary manslaughter). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (defining
manslaughter).
168. LAFAVE, supra note 119, § 15.4(a) (noting most prosecutions of criminal negligence involve
either a "high degree of risk ofdeath or great bodily harm," unlike ordinary civil negligence, awareness
of the risk, or both; recognizing that "[i]f both are required, 'recklessness' is the more appropriate
term"); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 118, at 107-08 (noting commonlaw allowed manslaughter based
on criminal negligence, which was not dependent on proof of awareness of one's creation of risk to life
or limb, while tendency of law today is toward "recklessness"). Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 118, § 31.08
(describing confusion in reference to "recklessness," as part of "criminal negligent manslaughter"
calculus).
169. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 467 S.E.2d 497, 500 (Ga. 1996) (stating that:
Criminal negligence as used in the statutes of this State means not merely such
negligence as might be the foundation of a damage suit, but reckless and wanton
negligence and of such a character as to show an utter disregard for the safety of
others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.
(quoting Helton v. State, 455 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)) (emphasis added). See also notes 218-
20 and accompanying text for additional caselaw which defines "criminal negligence" in terms that are
really the equivalent of what the Model Penal Code calls "recklessness."
170. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3(a) (West Supp. 2004). See also DECKER, supra note
100, §§ 6.27, 6.28 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing Illinois General Assembly's choice not to codify
"unlawful-act" involuntary manslaughter); LAFAVE, supra note 119, § 15.5 (discussing generally
unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter).
171. LAFAVE, supra note 119.
172. DRESSLER, supra note 118, § 31.09.
173. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 118, at 108.
174. LAFAVE, supra note 119, § 15.5(b).
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manslaughter: (1) the act was malum in se (wrongful in itself) rather than malum
prohibitum (forbidden by law but not intrinsically wrong);'75 (2) the accused's
unlawful act and a death were casually connected;"' and (3) the unlawful act was
inherently dangerous. '77 Also, the "misdemeanor-manslaughter rule" nomenclature
was somewhat misleading, because this branch of manslaughter sometimes
encompassed a death arising out of the commission of a felony that did not qualify
for felony-murderpurposes, and, as such, the "unlawful-act" label was deemed
more appropriate."'
Finally, according to the law followed in virtually all states, a person commits
murder if he or she kills another without justification in circumstances where he or
she either (1) intended to kill or inflict great bodily injury upon the victim (i.e., had
in mind the conscious purpose of taking life or causing serious physical injury); (2)
knew one's actions might kill or inflict great bodily injury (i.e., realized that his or
her conduct was practically certain to achieve such a result); (3) harbored a wanton
and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to life or limb (i.e., exhibited an
extreme or gross indifference to the value of life) or (4) intended to engage in an
inherently dangerous felony (i.e., had the purpose of committing an offense, such
as arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, which offense itself carries a great degree of
risk to life or limb of the intended victim).'79 While an intentional murder is at the
pinnacle of homicidal culpability, a finding of murder is also aproprate when a
person kills with what might be described as a "depraved heart " or with "extreme
recklessness"'' toward the value of life. Likewise, if one intends to commit a life-
threatening felony without any intent to kill the victim, a conviction for murder is
appropriate if death of the felony victim occurs.
In addition to crimes that could be used to prosecute the actual hunters who
have committed the offense, a theory of law exists which holds individuals
accountable for the conduct of others who are directly involved in an offense.
"Accomplice liability" is used to prosecute those who, either before or during the
commission of the offense, in some way assist or encourage the actual perpetrator
to commit a crime, assuming the alleged accomplice acts with the intent to further
the crime committed by the perpetrator.' Thus, when the accomplice and the
perpetrator enter into a "common design" to commit an offense, the accomplice and
175. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 118, at 108-11 (3d ed. 1982); LAFAVE, supra note 119,
§ 15.5(c), (d) & (e).
176. Id § 15.5(b).
177. DRESSLER, supra note 118, § 31.09.
178. Id.
179. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 118, at 57-71.
180. See LAFAVE, supra note 119, § 14.4 (discussing "depraved-heart" murder).
181. DRESSLER, supra note 118, § 31.05.
182. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (West 2004):
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to
promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts
to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense. However,
a person is not so accountable, unless the statute defining the offense provides
otherwise, if: (1) He is a victim of the offense committed; or
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct was inevitably incident to its
commission; or (3) Before the commission of the offense, he terminates his effort
to promote or facilitate such commission, and does one of the following: wholly
deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in such commission, or gives timely
warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or otherwise makes proper
effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
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the perpetrator are both liable for the offense." 3 Similarly, if the alleged accomplice
voluntarily attaches himself to a "group bent on criminality," he may be liable for
a crime committed by a member of the group.'84 Additionally, if another offense
occurs (beyond the intended offense) that is a "natural and probable consequence"
of the intended offense, the accomplice may be held accountable for this incidental
crime as well." 5 Thus, each of these legal measures provides possible avenues of
prosecution in the hunting context.
D. Prosecution Outside the Hunting Context
In the following section, this Article examines several examples outside the
context of hunting where an individual handled a firearm in a reckless manner and
faced prosecution. These cases demonstrate that law enforcement authorities
routinely prosecute wrongdoers whose non-hunting-related reckless conduct
endangers or, worse yet, takes the lives of innocent persons.
1. Reckless Endangerment and Similar Offenses
One offense used to prosecute reckless handling of guns outside the context of
hunting is "reckless endangerment." 86 In re ALJ," a Supreme Court of Wyoming
case, illustrates this point. There, the juvenile defendant attended a party with
several other young people. The defendant took what he later claimed was an
unloaded pistol to the party. On four occasions during the course of the night, the
defendant pointed the gun at individuals who were attending the party. Nobody was
physically injured as a result of the defendant's actions, and no one informed the
police of the defendant's behavior until several days after the party when the mother
of one of the partygoers told her son to notify the police. Police then charged the
defendant with reckless endangerment under Wyoming law.'88 At trial, the
defendant argued that he could only be guilty of reckless endangerment if he
actually put the victims in danger.' Specifically, he claimed that unless the
evidence established that the pistol was loaded, there could be no endangerment of
anyone."' The defendant was found guilty and adjudicated a delinquent.' 9 ' The
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's fiding and concluded that the
defendant was in fact guilty of reckless endangerment."' The court noted the
importance of protecting people from the potential harm that exists any time a
person points a gun at another"" and proclaimed that "whenever an actor knowingly
points a firearm at another, whether the firearm is loaded or not, he is guilty of
183. DECKER, supra note 100, § 3.10.
184. See id. §3.11.
185. See id. § 3.18.
186. See supra notes 156, 158-59 and accompanying text.
187. 836 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1992).
188. Id. at 309:
(a) A person is guilty of reckless endangering if he recklessly engages in conduct
which places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(b) Any person who knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another,
whether or not the person believes the firearm is loaded, is guilty of reckless
endangering unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or
abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another.
(quoting Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-504 (1988)).
189. Id. at 309-10.
190. Id. at 309.
191. Id. at 308-09.
192. Id. at 309-11.
193. In re ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 311 (Wyo. 1992).
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reckless endangerment provided the firearm was not pointed for defensive
purposes."' 94
In Commonwealth v. Rivera,' a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, the
defendant appealed a conviction for reckless endangerment arising out of a deadly
shooting. The defendant and his wife were at the defendant's place of business, his
bar. The defendant had recently purchased a gun to defend himself and his bar from
criminal acts. The defendant's wife was worried about the gun, and when she asked
to see it, the defendant took the gun from its hiding place and immediately shoved
the gun into his wife's stomach. He stated, "[D]on't joke with me because I have
a gun." At this point, the gun went off and fatally wounded the defendant's wife.
Police officers who responded to the scene testified that the defendant claimed he
loaded the gun two weeks prior to the event, and he admitted that he did not fully
understand how to operate the firearm. At his trial, the defendant claimed the
incident was an accident and, therefore, that a conviction of reckless endangerment
could not be sustained. Nevertheless, he was convicted. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that the defendant's accident claim was
"specious," and, as a result, the court affined his conviction of recklessly
endangering another person, namely his wife.'96 The shooting was unintentional,
because the defendant did not possess the intent to shoot his wife when he jokingly
placed the firearm at his wife's abdomen. However, the appellate court found
recklessness in the fact that the defendant realized he did not know how to operate
the gun, knew the gun was loaded, and yet proceeded to point the loaded gun at his
wife.' 97 Thus, his recklessness, which led to the death of an innocent person,
sufficed for a conviction of reckless endangerment. 98
Another offense used to prosecute reckless gun handling is "reckless
conduct,'" 99 which is similar in scope to reckless endangerment. In People v.
Johnson,"0 0 decided by the Illinois Appellate Court, three individuals entered the
defendant's property during their search for certain "intruders" in their
neighborhood. Immediately, the defendant, while holding a gun in his hand,
ordered the trio to leave. When they refused to leave, the defendant shot his gun
into the ground. The bullet from his gun ricocheted into the victim's chest and
caused injury. Thereafter, the state charged and convicted the defendant of reckless
conduct." l The court first noted that the defendant did not shoot in self-defense,
and next ruled as "inescapable" the conclusion that the defendant exhibited a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would or should
exercise in such a situation."°2
Meanwhile, in People v. Brownlee,"3 another Illinois Appellate Court opinion,
a police officer observed the defendant with another person on a street comer. As
the officer watched, the defendant pulled a revolver from his pocket, shot in the
direction of the officer's squad car, and threw the gun on the ground.2" The court
had little difficulty concluding that the defendant's actions were manifestations of
reckless conduct.20 5
194. Id. at 310.
195. 597 A.2d 690 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
196. Id. at 693.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
200. 314 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
201. Id. at 197-98.
202. Id. at 199.
203. 308 N.E.2d 377 (11. App. Ct. 1974).
204. Id. at 378.
205. Id. at 380-81.
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2. Involuntary Manslaughter and Similar Offenses
If a victim dies as a result of a reckless shooting, prosecutors routinely bring
charges of involuntary manslaughter when the conduct occurs outside the hunting
context. Involuntary manslaughter or similar homicidal liability may be based on
proof of (1) committing an unlawful act involving recklessness resulting in death
or (2) a reckless or criminally negligent killing on the part of the accused, without
any showing of the commission of a lesser offense which itself reflects a culpable
mental state. 2' The following material presents an example of the first approach
to finding involuntary manslaughter.
"Reckless handling of a firearm" is one type of charge that a person who has
killed another as a result of his reckless use of a weapon may face. The charge
may, in some cases, lead to a manslaughter conviction.20 7 For example, in Bailey
v. Commonwealth,2" the defendant's reckless handling of a firearm resulted in the
death of his friend. As a result, the defendant faced charges for involuntary
manslaughter. The incident arose while the defendant and some friends, including
the victim, were horse playing outside a residence. The defendant carried a .38
caliber pistol in his coat pocket. At some point, the defendant pulled the gun out
of his pocket, then immediately put it back into his pocket, whereupon the victim
fell to the ground. No argument had occurred between the defendant and victim.
Indeed, the victim's act of falling to the ground was simply part of the horseplay.
While the victim was lying on the ground, the defendant again attempted to pull off
his stunt, but this time, it was no laughing matter. The defendant pulled the gun out
of his pocket, held the gun with his palm up toward the victim while the victim
remained on the ground five to ten feet away, and the gun discharged, striking the
victim in the back and killing him. After being convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, the defendant claimed on appeal that the shooting was an accident.2 9
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant's act of pulling the loaded
gun from his pocket and pointing it in the direction of the victim constituted the
unlawful offense of reckless handling of a firearm and proximately caused the
victim's death.21 The court stated that the defendant's act of killing could be
viewed as either a result of the unlawful act committed with criminal negligence or
the consequence of a lawful act performed with a reckless disregard for human
life.2 1' Either way, the defendant's conduct created a situation where it was "clearly
foreseeable that another could be seriously injured or killed if the gun was
discharged," and the court affirmed the conviction for involuntary manslaughter."
Furthermore, in Strode v. State,2t3 the Supreme Court of Mississippi found the
defendant guilty of a fatal shooting on proof of his culpable negligence. The
defendant resided in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Carter. One evening, after cleaning
his handgun, Mr. Carter told the defendant that he had fired all the bullets from the
gun, and he had no more cartridges for reloading the gun. Mr. Carter then put the
gun in its holster and placed it in his chest of drawers. Later that night, outside the
presence of the defendant, Mr. Carter found several rounds of ammunition. Mr.
Carter then reloaded his gun with the ammunition, placed the handgun back into its
holster, and returned the weapon to the chest of drawers. He did not tell anyone that
206. See supra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.1 (Michie 1996) ("It shall be unlawfuf for any person
to handle recklessly any firearm so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person.").
208. 362 S.E.2d 750 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
209. Id. at 752.
210. Id. ("It shall be unlawful for any person to handle recklessly a firearm so as to endanger the
life, limb or property of any person.") (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-56.1).
211. Id. at 751-52.
212. Id. at 751.
213. 406 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1981).
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he had reloaded the gun.214 After work the next day, the defendant met three of his
friends including the victim at the Carter's home. The foursome decided to go
hunting. However, while still in the Carter house, the defendant showed his friends
what he believed to be the unloaded handgun that Mr. Carter had cleaned the night
before. The defendant joked with his friends about the gun, and then he waved the
gun in the air. The victim and another of the three friends were standing
approximately six feet in front of the defendant, and another friend was sitting
nearby. When the defendant lowered the gun, it fired and fatally wounded the
victim. At his manslaughter trial, the defendant testified that he did not think the
gun was loaded, but he did admit to horsing around with the gun. The defendant
also testified that the gun slipped out of his hand, and as he tried to catch it, the gun
accidentally went off while pointed at the victim. The Mississippi trial court,
however, found the defendant guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence, which
in Mississippi requires some type of "reckless conduct" that is "tantamount to a
wanton disregard of, orutter indifference to, the safety of human life."2"5 On appeal,
the Mississippi Supreme Court repeated its earlier proclamation that, "'[i]f the
pointing of a loaded pistol at a human being is not culpable negligence,.., then it
would be difficult for the mind of mortal man to conceive of stronger facts which
would constitute such negligence."' 216 Hence, the court affirmed the defendant's
manslaughter conviction."'
Similarly, in State v. Davis,"' the defendant was preparing to show the victim
his 16-gauge shotgun. However, while doing so, the defendant's finger hit the
trigger ofthe gun, and the gun discharged and fatally wounded the victim. The state
charged the defendant with murder in the second degree. At trial, the defendant
testified he did not know that the gun was loaded, although he admitted he had not
made certain that the gun was unloaded before showing it to the victim. Although
the state prosecuted the defendant for murder in the second degree, the trial court
convicted him of the lesser offense of manslaughter. 19 The court ruled that the
conviction was proper and that the "[d]efendant's [own] testimony was sufficient
evidence of reckless conduct, and therefore culpable negligence, on his part to
support the manslaughter conviction.
220
In People v. Zahner, 22' the Appellate Court of Illinois found the reckless
handling of a loaded gun to be a sufficient basis for recklessness in an involuntary
manslaughter charge. In Zahner, the defendant and his twin brother, the victim,
were engaged in a friendly wrestling match over a 410 pump shotgun. At some
point in this encounter, the defendant obtained exclusive possession of the gun.
When the wrestling ended, the defendant first loaded the gun with an empty shell,
and then a live round. The defendant believed that the shells would fire in the order
loaded. However, when he cocked the gun, it fired and fatally wounded the victim.
Later, he stated that he did not know the gun was pointed at the victim or that he
pulled the trigger as the shell was jacked into the chamber. Nevertheless, the State
of Illinois brought charges of involuntary manslaughter against the defendant.
Following the defendant's conviction, the appellate court ruled that this series of
214. Id. at 821.
215. Id. at 822 (citing Latiker v. State, 278 So.2d 398 (Miss. 1973)).
216. Id. (quoting Robertson v. State, 121 So. 492, 493 (Miss. 1928)).
217. Thus, it was the bad luck of the defendant Ricky Strode that this tragic incident did not occur
on the foursome's anticipated hunting trip, because as the previous section of this article illustrates, if
this incident had occurred on the hunting fields, it is probable that no charges would have been filed
or the charge would have been dismissed before reaching trial.
218. 691 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
219. Id. at 333 n.1 ("Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable neg-
ligence of another ... shall be deemed manslaughter.") (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.005 (1982)).
220. Id. at 334.
221. 396 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
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acts constituted recklessness for the purposes of involuntary manslaughter.222 Here,
the defendant recklessly loaded a gun with a live shell and pointed the loaded gun
at the victim. As such, "nothing in the record" established a mere accident.223 Even
though the prosecutor stated, "[tihere are accidents and there are accidents," the
appellate court construed this to mean that the prosecutor was merely arguing that
the defendant's conduct constituted more than a mere "accident" or ordinary
negligence.224 The court found that the jury properly could have found recklessness
from the defendant's acts.225
Importantly, courts in many states have ruled that the mere pointing of a loaded
gun at another is such a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise that it constitutes recklessness226 for purposes of the crimes
reckless endangerment2 " and involuntary manslaughter. 28 For example, in People
v. Bauman, 9 a festive christening celebration turned out to be a drunken feud that
led to the death of a family member. After excessive drinking the entire day at the
victim's house, the defendant and his fiance6 began fighting. When the defendant
began beating his fiance6, other members of the group intervened and attempted to
break up the fight. The victim and the defendant's brother persisted in their efforts
to stop the fight, but the inebriated defendant warned those who approached him to
"leave [him] alone. '23 ° However, as the victim persisted in his attempt to stop the
defendant from beating his fiance6, the defendant fired a shot from his .25 caliber
automatic pistol into the ground. Still, the victim continued his attempt to break up
the fight, and the defendant shot his gun a second time, killing the victim."' At
trial, the defendant claimed the shooting was an accident. The trial and appellate
courts held that, even if the shooting was unintentional, the mere pointing of the
loaded gun in the victim's direction constituted recklessness and was a sufficient
basis to warrant a finding of involuntary manslaughter.232
Pointing a gun at an innocent person led to another manslaughter conviction in
the Mississippi Supreme Court ruling ofJernigan v. State.233 There, the defendant
drove to the home of an acquaintance to buy some beer. At that location, the
defendant encountered the victim and asked him for some money to purchase the
beer, but the victim refused. The defendant then picked up a gun that was lying on
the car seat and said, "[a]w yeah, you are going to buy me one." 34 As the victim
turned toward the defendant, the defendant "pointed the gun at [the victim] and shot
222. Id. at 594.
223. Id. at 595.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., People v. Hoover, 620 N.E.2d 1152, 1161-62 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
evidence sufficient for involuntary manslaughter conviction); People v. Bembroy, 281 N.E.2d 389,393
(111. App. Ct. 1972) (finding evidence sufficient for involuntary manslaughter conviction). Cf. People
v. Smith, 567 N.E.2d 489, 495 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing involuntary manslaughter conviction
because defendant unintentionally pointing a gun at the victim did not, of itself, give rise to a
presumption of recklessness). However, some states have ruled that the pointing of an unloaded gun
does not constitute recklessness, because there is no inherent danger in pointing the gun. See
Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 n. 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (reversing conviction
for recklessly endangering person).
227. See In re ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 1992).
228. People v. Schwartz, 382 N.E.2d 59, 64 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978) (affirming involuntary man-
slaughter conviction).
229. 340 N.E.2d 178 (II1. App. Ct. 1975).
230. Id. at 179.
231. Id. at 179-80.
232. Id. at 183.
233. 305 So.2d 353 (Miss. 1974).
234. Id. at 353.
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him in the chest, killing him."23 5 Later, the defendant admitted to having the gun in
his hand when it discharged, but he said he did not know the gun was loaded. At
his trial for murder, the defendant testified that he thought the gun was empty and
he pointed the gun at the victim because he and the victim frequently "pranked
with" each other in this manner.236 Also, the state's evidence revealed no ill
feelings between the defendant and the victim. Thus, the defendant maintained that
the discharging of the gun was simply an accident. That evidence notwithstanding,
the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court ruled that the evidence "overwhelmingly" supported the jury's verdict.2 7 The
Mississippi Supreme Court observed that the act of pointing a loaded pistol at a
human being "unequivocally shows a conscious, wanton, and reckless disregard
of... likely fatal consequences." '238
Similarly, in State v. Reed,239 a practical joke involving a gun led to
manslaughter. In this case, the victim was visiting the residence of the defendant.
Defendant, then twenty-three years old, had known the sixteen-year-old victim for
about six months, and the two dated on a regular basis. The evidence revealed that
the victim frequently visited the defendant's home, and on this particular occasion,
the defendant and the victim went to the defendant's room where they were "just
joking around."24 The defendant picked up one of the three shotguns that he kept
behind his bedroom door, pointed it at the victim, and pulled the trigger. The gun
discharged, and the victim died from the gunshot wound, inflicted from a distance
of three feet or less. Immediately after the shooting, family members present in the
house summoned an ambulance and the police. The first officer who arrived at the
scene found the victim lying on the defendant's bed and the shotgun containing one
spent round of ammunition laying nearby. The defendant was crying. The officer
transported the defendant to the police station.24' At the station, another police
officer reported that the defendant "looked upset" and was "like crying. "242
Notwithstanding the defendant's difficulty in speaking, he did give the police a
recorded statement and was "very cooperative. 2 43 The investigation revealed no
evidence of any bad motive, disagreement, or other basis to explain this tragic
incident. The defendant, however, was charged with aggravated manslaughter. 44
At trial, the defendant stated that to his knowledge, he never had a loaded
weapon in the house, and he did not believe the shotgun at issue was loaded at the
time of the incident. He testified that he and an acquaintance had last used the gun
while hunting a week or two prior to the incident. He testified that he told his
companion to unload the gun when they returned from the hunting trip, but he
conceded that he did not confirm that the shotgun was, in fact, unloaded.245 The
jury found the defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter, a lesser-included offense
of aggravated manslaughter.2" The New Jersey Superior Court affirmed this ruling,
finding that the evidence warranted such a conclusion.247 The court determined that
the accused's actions in picking up the shotgun, failing to establish that it was not
235. Id.
236. Id. at 354.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 511 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
240. Id. at 681.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 681-82.
243. Id. at 682.
244. Id. at 681.
245. State v. Reed, 511 A.2d 680, 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
246. Id. at681.
247. Id. at 684.
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loaded, aiming it at the victim, and pulling the trigger, amounted to behavior that
manifested an "extreme indifference to human life.
248
3. Murder
In People v. St. Helen,249 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
affinmed the conviction of murder in the second degree as a result of defendant's
reckless shooting of the victim. The defendant pointed a gun at the victim in an
attempt to frighten him. Although the defendant realized that the gun was loaded,
he thought no bullets were in the first two chambers. After the defendant pulled the
trigger a second time, the gun discharged and shot the victim, who subsequently
died of complications from the resulting injuries. The defendant later insisted that
he was "only playing a game with the victim, and that the shooting was an
accident.""' However, the court ruled that the facts established beyond a reasonable
doubt the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree based upon his reckless
conduct."' 1 . The court looked at the factual circumstances and determined that
pointing the loaded gun at the victim and pulling the trigger presented a "grave risk
of death" and thus supported the jury's verdict.
4. Accomplice Liability
One who intentionally enters into a "common design" with another individual
or individuals for the purpose of committing a criminal offense may be held
accountable not only for intended criminal behavior carried out by a member of the
group, but also for any incidental criminality that is a natural and probable
consequence of the intended conduct.
In People v. Cole,5 3 the State used the theory of accomplice liability to charge
the defendant with involuntary manslaughter for a death arising out of a shooting
incident. 2 4 The defendant and three other men, including the victim, were involved
in the incident, which was supposed to be a prank. All four men drove to a farm
where they planned to do some target shooting. On the way to the farm, the group
stopped at the house of the mother of one of the men, named Hill, and picked up
three weapons: a rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a .357 Smith and Wesson revolver.
Before the group arrived at the farm, the victim fell asleep in the vehicle. While
the victim slept, the defendant told Hill about his intention to scare the victim by
each of them firing their guns at the ground. Once the group of men arrived at the
farm, the defendant, Hill, and Carrera-another man in the group-walked to the
farmhouse while the victim still slept in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. In
the farmhouse, the defendant again told Hill of his intention that they
simultaneously fire the three guns at the ground to scare the sleeping victim. The
defendant explained to Hill that the revolver had a bullet in the first chamber, then
one empty chamber, then four other chambers with bullets. The shotgun and rifle
were loaded each with one bullet. Conflicting testimony existed about whether Hill
was to point the revolver at the victim after fn'ing at the ground, at which time the
gun supposedly would have an empty chamber."'
248. Id. (remanding the matter for resentencing).
249. 742 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
250. Id. at 640-41.
251. Id. at 641. The court also convicted the defendant of criminal possession of a weapon. Id.
252. Id.
253. 625 N.E.2d 816 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
254. Id. at 818 (charging the defendant with involuntary manslaughter, concealment of a
homicidal death, and aggravated assault, with only the charge of involuntary manslaughter dealing with
accomplice liability).
255. Id. at 818-19.
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In any event, the men returned to the vehicle and drove to an abandoned barn.
At that point, Hill, Carrera, and the defendant exited the truck and left the doors
open with the victim inside sleeping. All three men then simultaneously fired their
guns into the ground. When the gunshots woke the victim, the defendant and
Carrera pointed their guns at the victim, and the defendant stated, "it's time to die."
Then the defendant and Carrera pulled the triggers on their guns, making a clicking
sound. When Hill pointed his revolver at the victim and pulled the trigger, he killed
the victim with a shot to the head.2"6
The defendant argued that his conviction ofinvoluntary manslaughter could not
be sustained on an accountability theory, because no evidence indicated that he
intended to kill the victim." 7 The appellate court agreed that the defendant did not
intend to kill the victim.25 However, the court ruled that the evidence was
sufficient for a trier of fact to find a common design to engage in a criminal act
between the defendant, Hill, and Carrera." 9 Under the common-design rule, when
two or more parties enter into a common agreement or purpose to commit a crime,
all acts in furtherance of the common design are considered acts of all members of
the party, and as a result, all parties will be held equally liable for any
consequences.26 Here, the common design was to engage in the criminal offense
of "reckless conduct," which occurred when they agreed to point their guns at the
victim."' Thus, the common design to commit the crime intended led to the
incidental crime of involuntary manslaughter.262 The appellate court affirmed the
lower court's ruling because sufficient evidence existed for ajury to find a common
design between the defendant, Hill, and Carrera that eventually led to the death of
the victim.263
E. The Killing Fields: The Laxity of Prosecution of Reckless Hunting
Hunting is practically immune from the application of state criminal law
designed to address reckless behavior. An exhaustive Westlaw search264 produced
256. Id. at 819.
257. Id. at 820.
258. Id.
259. People v. Cole, 625 N.E.2d 816, 821-22 (11I. App. Ct. 1993) (holding evidence sufficient
to support the jury's finding of a common design between defendant, Hill and Carrera to commit the
offenses of aggravated assault and reckless conduct); see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-2 (West
Supp. 2004) (defining "aggravated assault" as when a person puts another in reasonable apprehension
of a battery and.., discharges a firearm); id. at 5/12-5 (West 2002) (defining "reckless conduct" as
occurring when "[a] person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual
by any means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or
endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful").
260. Id. at 820-21 (citing People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d. 746, 749 (II. 1984)).
261. Id. at 821.
262. Id. at 822.
263. Id.
264. Searches using terms and connectors included limiting the scope to criminal cases and
searching under "hunting" and "shooting"; "hunting accident"; "hunting" and "accident" and
"shooting"; "hunting" and "criminal negligence"; and "reckless hunting." Searches using natural
language included phrases such as: "while hunting a hunter recklessly and accidentally shoots another
human being and he dies and is tried in a criminal case by the state and found guilty or innocent";
"while hunting a hunter recklessly and accidentally shoots another human being and kills him and is
tried in a criminal case by the state"; "criminal case while hunting a hunter recklessly and accidentally
shoots another human being and kills him"; "while hunting a hunter recklessly and accidentally shoots
another human being and kills him"; and "while hunting a hunter recklessly and accidentally shoots
another human being and kills him."
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a mere forty-three possibly relevant cases 265 illustrating the less than
265. United States v. Fletcher, 13 C.M.R. 165 (A.C.M.R. 1953) (finding that the evidence did
not support the defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on culpable negligence in
discharge of a weapon where the defendant killed the victim after slipping and falling on his gun while
hunting); Hines v. State, 578 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 2003) (finding that the defendant was properly convicted
of felony-murder based on the underlying crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where
the defendant and several others who went turkey hunting split into two groups, with the defendant and
his friend in one area and the victim and others in another area, and the defendant heard a turkey gobble
and fired a shot, hitting the victim about eighty feet away); Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204
(Pa. 2002) (affirming a first-degree murder conviction where the initial investigation of skeet shooting
incident led to the conclusion that the victim's death resulted from a "hunting accident," but
investigation twenty years later revealed that the defendant had concealed existence of an affair he had
with the victim's wife prior to the shooting; defendant admitted to committing peijury to cover up the
actual details surrounding the shooting and could not demonstrate that the twenty-year delay violated
due process); State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2001) (finding a proper conviction for first-
degree manslaughter with a firearm, where during closed season, without a hunting license or deer
permit, and without the property owner's permission, the defendant shot the victim he mistook for a
deer in a wooded thicket); State v. Scott, 522 S.E.2d 626, 629-30, 635 (W.Va. 1999) (per curiam)
(upholding conviction of second-degree murder where defendant thought the "glimpses of red" at which
he shot were a squirrel and that defendant checked the victim's pulse and fled the scene, and finding
malice given the substantial evidence refuting the claim that the shooting was a hunting "accident");
Chapman v. State, 467 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 1996) (finding a proper conviction of felony-murder based on
misuse of firearm while hunting where the defendant shot his gun from across a road at what he thought
was a deer, but actually was the victim); State v. Ivey, 474 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W.Va. 1996) (affirming
the defendant's conviction for negligent shooting of a person while hunting where the defendant and
a friend, the victim, were preparing to head home after a day of hunting, but before doing so, the
defendant removed clip from his gun andlaid the gun across his arm pointed toward the victim,
whereupon a bullet still in gun chamber discharged, killing the victim); State v. Bordelon, 597 So.2d
147 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring a remand to the trial court in prosecution for second-degree murder,
where, at trial, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress confession to shooting and killing his
father while hunting); Mainor v. State, 387 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1990) (upholding conviction of
felonymurder based on underlying crime of aggravated assault where defendant was illegally hunting
deer out of season while trespassing on another person's property when he shot victim, who was
engaged in legal bow hunting twenty-five feet away); State v. Busby, 464 So. 2d 262 (La. 1985)
(finding a proper conviction of first-degree murder where the defendant talked the victim into
accompanying him squirrel hunting with the intent of killing him in retaliation for an earlier insult, and
thereafter, the defendant shot the victim in the back from twelve feet away with a 12-gauge shotgun);
Gooden v. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 780, 785 (Va. 1984) (finding that the defendant was properly
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for shooting and killing victim, whom he claimed he mistook
for a deer, where no deer were anywhere close to the victim when he was shot); State v. Low, 635 A.2d
478 (N.H. 1993) (affirming a conviction of negligent homicide where the defendant shot at a moving
object, which he believed to be a deer, but was actually another hunter); State v. Perfetto, 424 A. 2d
1095 (Me. 1981) (affirming the defendant's manslaughter conviction where he shot the victim while
hunting for deer and where the evidence revealed that the defendant fired his gun without knowing at
what he was shooting); State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1979) (affirming conviction of second-
degree manslaughter, where the defendant and the victim set out to go duck hunting but then decided
to hunt bear out of season, during which time defendant shot at a dark object, which he thought was a
bear but was actually the victim); Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975) (affirming convictions
of involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's sonwas hunting out of season in weather conditions
which impaired visibility and mistakenly shot the victim who he thought was a deer, and defendant
father failed to fulfill his duty to render aid); Drake v. State, 144 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 1965) (reversing a
murder conviction where the defendant shot and killed victim while engaged in either legal fox hunting
or out-of-season deer hunting in misty or foggy weather conditions, because the lower court erred in
refusing to charge on lesser charge of manslaughter in light of evidence showing that the defendant
killed the victim without anyintention of doing so in either the commission of a lawful act, fox hunting,
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or illegal act, deer hunting out of season); State v. Dinan, 184 A.2d 466 (Me. 1962) (upholding the
defendant's conviction of the careless shooting of human being while engaged in hunting and finding
that the trial court did not err in admitting certain photographs); State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505 (Wis.
1962) (affirming the defendant's murder conviction where he claimed that he accidentally shot a
thirteen-year-old boy in the back while hunting, then shot him in the head to cover up the accident, and
the defendant's claim of insanity proved unsuccessful); State v. Jones, 126 A.2d 273 (Me. 1956)
(finding that instruction basing liability on civil negligence rather than criminal negligence was
reversible error where the court convicted the defendant of negligently and carelessly shooting and
wounding a human being while hunting); State v. Euart, 98 A.2d 556 (Me. 1953) (finding that failure
to specifically allege how the defendant's conduct fell within the reach of statute was not error where
the defendant was indicted for negligently and carelessly shooting and wounding a human being while
hunting); Vires v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W.2d 837-38 (Ky. 1948) (reversing the defendant's
conviction for voluntary manslaughter where the defendant hunter killed the victim he mistook for a
fox, because the trial court erroneously instructed thejury on "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter
and failed to instruct on (1) voluntary manslaughter based on reckless disregard for human safety and
(2) involuntary manslaughter based on reckless use of a firearm); Woodruff v. State, 48 S.E.2d 885
(Ga. 1948) (affirming murder conviction where defendant claimed that during target practice, he
accidentally killed the victim, his friend, and left the scene in shock); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 547
S.E.2d 513, 514, 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the convictions of involuntary manslaughter and
reckless use of a firearm where the defendant, an experienced hunter, shot the victim while turkey
hunting and stated that he "heard a turkey call and saw and heard some movement, and he fired at the
movement," without actually seeing a turkey or knowing of the victim's whereabouts); State v. Weber,
No. 99-1571-cr, 2000 WL 136782 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (affirming order denying motion to
withdraw plea of no contest to misdemeanor of endangering another's safety by the negligent operation
or handling of a dangerous weapon following charges that the defendant, while hunting deer without
a license, shot and killed his hunting partner, although he maintained that he believed he was shooting
a deer); People v. Cummings, 585 N.W.2d 299 (Mich. 1998) (reinstating the defendant's involuntary
manslaughter conviction where the defendant believed he saw the antlers of a deer one hour before
sunrise, fired his gun twice, contrary to a Michigan Department of Natural Resources regulation that
outlawed shooting before sunrise, and killed a man, because "the uncontested facts adduced at trial
established that the firing of the weapon by the defendant was intentional," and, as such, the circuit
court properly refused a requested instruction on the lesser offense of careless, reckless, and negligent
discharge of a firearm causing death); State ex. rel. S.T., 677 So.2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(reversing and dismissing the trial court's finding of delinquency based on commission of negligent
homicide, because the incident was merely an "accident" where ajuvenile testified that he saw a buck
deer through his telescope after seeing deer's antlers, head, and shoulders and then shot at the deer,
killing instead the victim situated in dense woods); State v. Landherr, 542 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that the defendant could not beconvicted of attempted manslaughter in the second
degree, because he lacked specific intent to commit manslaughter where he shot and injured a person
with a firearm as a result of negligently believing the person was a wild turkey); State v. Lindvig, 555
N.W.2d 197, 198-99 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the defendant was not entitled to a mistake of
fact instruction, because the "subjective state ofmind is not essential to the crime" involving negligence
and affirming the conviction where the defendant was convicted of causing injury to another by the
negligent operation of a dangerous weapon after he struck the victim with an arrow shot from his cross-
bow while deer hunting); Farley v. Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing and
remanding the defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter and reckless handling of a firearm
after he shot another turkey hunter, who was dressed in camouflage and was using a turkey call while
hiding in a bush, because the trial court withheld expert testimony on "closure," which involves the
tendency of the human brain, when receiving ambiguous stimuli, to sense an image of something the
person did not actually see); Cable v. Commonwealth, 405 S.E.2d 444 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) aft d, 415
S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1992) (finding a proper conviction of involuntary manslaughter where a vision-
impaired defendant, who was not wearing glasses necessary for long-distance vision, killed the victim,
a friend, while turkey and squirrel hunting and conceded that he was only shooting at "movement")
aff'd, 415 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1992); Commonwealth v. Padelsky, 6 Pa. D. & C. 4th 642 (C.P.1990)
(dismissing the defendant's petition for habeas corpus where the defendant was charged with careless
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vigorous enforcement of existing laws with regard to cases involving deaths or
injuries resulting from so-called "hunting accidents." These decisions spanned a
fifty-five year period, with no opinions being found prior to 1948.266 The fact that
the forty-three published opinions found were mainly appellate decisions suggests
that a greater number of opinions would have been found if serious charges had
been filed in hunting incidents resulting in death or injuries, because presumably
many of the cases resulting in conviction would have been appealed. This also
and negligent shooting and injuring another hunter in circumstances where he mistook movement for
a turkey; remanding to trial court for further proceedings); In re of Mellott, 476 A.2d 11-12, 15 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984) (reversing and remanding a juvenile's delinquen adjudication, because no Miranda
warnings were given before game wardens interrogated the juvenile after he "accidentally" shot and
killed another hunter whom he "momentarily and mistakenly believed to be a wild turkey"); State v.
Hall, 299 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial due
to the trial court's failure to properly instruct jury regarding the elements of criminal negligence
necessary for manslaughter where the defendant shot a member of another hunting party he believed
to be a deer and was convicted of involuntary manslaughter); State v. Puryear, 590 P.2d 475 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1979) (finding a proper conviction ofinvoluntary manslaughter where charge arose from unlawful
acts of hunting migratory birds with an unlawful weapon, a rifle instead of a shotgun, and shooting
from a road, which unlawful acts were inherently dangerous and caused the victim's death); Dennis v.
State, 556 P.2d 617, 619, 621 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (reversing and remanding a second-degree
murder conviction where the defendant shot at a fox and thought he missed but killed the victim instead,
considering that the evidence was "consistent with the defense theory of a tragic hunting accident" and
because the trial court failed to instruct on "excusable homicide"); People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr. 112
( Ct. App. 1968) (reversing lower courts order that district attorney file an information charging
defendant with only involuntary manslaughter and not murder where the defendant lied to authorities
in claiming that the killing of his shooting victim was a hunting "'accident" when the victim was killed
by shot fired from defendant's hunting rifle, and the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing
suggested that the shooting was not "accidental" hut rather intentional and, thus, with malice
aforethought as required for murder); People v. Ferry, 267 N.Y.S.2d 649, 649-51 (County Ct. 1966)
(upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's request for preliminary hearing on charge of criminal
negligence pending against the defendant arising out of a "hunting episode in which another was
killed"); In re Bogart, 259 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357 (N.Y. Family Ct. 1963) (upholding the trial court's
denial of petition filed by the mother of a shooting victim requesting proceeding to inquire whether the
fourteen-year-old boy should be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by reason of criminal negligence
while engaged in hunting that resulted in death to another person; explaining the rule from People v.
Carson, 26 N.Y. S.2d 1003, 1005 (N.Y. County Ct. 1941) "[m]ere lack of foresight, stupidity,
irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, ordinary carelessness, however serious the consequences may happen
to be, do not constitute culpable negligence;") People v. Swygert, 196 N.Y.S.2d 231, 231 ( County Ct.
1960) (granting the defendant's motion to inspect minutes of grand jury investigation to determine if
defendant's conduct only demonstrated "a mere careless shooting which resulted in death" where the
defendant was indicted for criminal negligence for a shooting resulting in fatality, said shooting taking
place in the course of a hunt); Stallings v. State, Il l S.E.2d 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959) (affirming a
conviction of involuntary manslaughter in commission of an unlawful act, merely shooting a pistol in
a direction where other persons might be located, where a boy hunting squirrels while trespassing on
defendant's property was killed by the defendant property owner); People v. Dawson, 133 N.Y.S.2d
423 ( Sup. Ct. 1954) (dismissing the defendant's indictment for criminal negligence while engaged in
hunting, after killing a man, where evidence was found insufficient as a matter of law to establish
criminal negligence necessary to convict); People v. Smaka, 127 N.Y.S.2d 556 (County Ct. 1954)
(upholding an indictment for criminal negligence, arising out of fatal shooting, where evidence revealed
that the defendant fired a weapon at a "moving object" without distinguishing at what he was shooting);
People v. Joyce, 84 N.Y.S.2d 238, 243-44 (County Ct. 1948) (dismissing an indictment for
manslaughter in the second degree where the defendant shot at what he thought was the hind end of a
deer, but was in fact the victim, a man he fatally wounded).
266. Id, The earliest opinion found was from 1948, and the earliest charges sustained by a re-
viewing court occurred in 1954.
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suggests that either these incidents are not being prosecuted or the charges are
merely minor misdemeanors, such as reckless handling of a firearm. Of the forty-
three cases that involved hunting (or claims of hunting), four were convictions for
intentional murder, but in all of these cases, hunting was used as a pretense to kill
another.267 Only one second-degree murder conviction was sustained,268 while
three murder charges were set aside,269 one on grounds of insufficient evidence."'
Three felony-murder convictions were upheld based on proof of underlying felonies
of aggravated assault,2 ' shooting across a road, 72 and possession of a weapon by
a felon.2" Nine cases upheld involuntary manslaughter convictions,27 while four
267. State v. Busby, 464 So.2d 262 (La. 1985); State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1962);
Woodruff v. State, 48 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. 1948); Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 2002).
See supra note 265 (outlining the aforementioned cases).
268. State v. Scott, 522 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1999) (per curiam). See supra note 265 (providing
the factual background of the case).
269. State v. Bordelon, 597 So.2d 147 (La. 1992) (remanding case in prosecution for second-
degree murder, remand to trial court to determine whether defendant was sane when he made statements
confessing to shooting father while hunting); Dennis v. State, 556 P.2d 617, 619, 621 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1976) (reversing and remanding a murder conviction where evidence supported the theory that
defendant's fatal shooting of victim whom he mistook for a fox was a "tragic hunting accident" and
because trial court failed to instruct on "excusable homicide"); Drake v. State, 144 S.E.2d 519 (Ga.
1965) (reversing murder conviction where defendant shot and killed victim while engaged in hunting
in misty or foggy weather conditions, because evidence showed that defendant killed victim without
any intention of doing so).
270. Drake, 144 S.E.2d 519.
271. Mainor v. State, 387 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1990).
272. Chapman v. State, 467 S.E.2d 497, 498 (Ga. 1996).
273. Hines v. State, 578 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 2003).
274. State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2001) (affirming defendant's conviction of
manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm where, during closed season, without a hunting license
or deer permit and without property owner's permission, he shot victim he mistook for a deer in a
wooded thicket); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 513 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming conviction
of involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm where the defendant, an experienced hunter,
shot the victim while turkey hunting, and later conceded that he shot at "movement" without actually
seeing a turkey or knowing of the victim's whereabouts); People v. Cummings, 585 N.W.2d 299 (Mich.
1998) (reinstating the defendant's involuntary manslaughter conviction where the defendant believed
he saw the antlers of a deer, fired his gun twice contrary to state regulation that outlawed shooting
before sunrise, and killed a man); Cable v. Commonwealth, 405 S.E.2d 444 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd,
415 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1992) (upholding conviction for involuntary manslaughter where a vision-
impaired defendant, who was not wearing glasses necessary for long-distance vision while hunting later
conceded he was only shooting at "movement"); Gooden v. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 780 (Va. 1984)
(affirming conviction of defendant for involuntary manslaughter for shooting victim he thought to be
a deer, where no deer were anywhere close to the victim when he was shot); State v. Perfetto, 424 A.
2d 1095 (Me. 1981) (affirming defendant's manslaughter conviction where he shot victim while
hunting for deer, where evidence revealed defendant fired his gun without knowing at what he was
shooting); State v. Puryear, 590 P.2d 475 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (finding defendant properly convicted
of involuntary manslaughter, where charge arose from unlawful acts of hunting migratory birds with
an unlawful weapon and shooting from a road); Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975)
(upholding convictions of involuntary manslaughter where defendant son was illegally hunting out of
season in weather conditions which impaired visibility, mistakenly shot victim he thought was a deer,
and defendant father failed to exercise his duty to render aid to the victim); Stallings v. State, Ill
S.E.2d 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959) (affirming conviction of involuntary manslaughter in commission of
an unlawful act, namely, where defendant, a property owner disgruntled about trespassing hunters, was
shooting a pistol in a direction where other persons might be located).
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involuntary manslaughter charges were reversed or dismissed,2"' two on grounds of
insufficient evidence." 6 While one second-degree manslaughter conviction was
affirmed,277 the single voluntary manslaughter conviction was set aside on
procedural grounds." Likewise, the only attempted manslaughter charge was
tossed out on insufficient evidence grounds.279 Regarding negligent homicide, one
conviction was upheld,2"' and another was reversed on grounds of insufficient
evidence.2"' The "negligently shooting" or "carelessly shooting" charges (though
not necessarily convictions) were successful in eight cases282 and unsuccessful in
four others." 3 In an unusual disposition, one court reversed a lower court order that
a district attorney file information charging the defendant with involuntary
manslaughter as opposed to murder.28 4 Finally, a juvenile delinquency allegation
275. Farley v. Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing defendant's con-
victions of involuntary manslaughter and reckless handling of a firearm in trial court where he shot
another hunter, thinking he was a turkey, because trial court withheld expert testimony explaining how
defendant's brain impulses might have made him think he actually saw a turkey even though no animal
was present); State v. Hall, 299 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing involuntary manslaughter
conviction where defendant shot another hunter he believed to be a deer, because trial court did not
properly instruct jury regarding elements of criminal negligence necessary for manslaughter); United
States v. Fletcher, 13 C.M.R. 165 (A.C.M.R. 1953) (ruling that the defendant's conviction of
involuntary manslaughter, which the prosecution claimed was based on the defendant's culpable
negligence in discharge of a weapon, was not supported by the evidence where the defendant killed the
victim after slipping and falling on his gun while hunting); People v. Joyce, 84 N.Y.S.2d 238, 243-44
(N.Y. County Ct. 1948) (dismissing the indictment ofsecond-degree manslaughter where the defendant
shot and killed what he thought was a deer, but actually was the victim).
276. Joyce, 84 N.Y.S.2d 238; Fletcher, 13 C.M.R. 165.
277. State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1979).
278. Vires v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W. 2d 837 (Ky. 1948) (reversing conviction in light of
erroneous jury charge).
279. State v. Landherr, 542 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that evidence did not
support conviction for attempted manslaughter where defendant lacked specific intent).
280. State v. Low, 635 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1984) (upholding conviction for negligent homicide where
defendant shot at moving object he thought was a deer but was actually the victim).
281. State ex. rel. S.T., 677 So.2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing a finding of delinquency
based on negligent homicide where incident was merely an "accident").
282. See supra note 265 (discussing State v. Ivey, 474 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1996); State v. Weber,
No. 99-1571-CR, 2000 WL 136782 (Wisc. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000); State v. Lindvig, 555 N.W.2d. 197
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Padelsky, 6 Pa. D & C. 4th 642 (Pa. C.P. 1990); People v.
Ferry, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (County Ct. 1966); State v. Dinan, 184 A.2d 466 (Me. 1962); State v. Euart,
98 A.2d 556 (Me. 1953); People v. Smaka, 127 N.Y.2d 556 (County Ct. 1954)).
283. In re Bogart, 259 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357 (Fam. Ct. 1963) (upholding the trial court's denial of
petition filed by mother of shooting victim requesting proceeding to inquire whether fourteen-year-old
boy should be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by reason of criminal negligence for causing death to
another person while engaged in hunting); People v. Swygert, 196 N.Y.S.2d 231, 231-32 (County Ct.
1960) (granting the defendant's motion to inspect minutes of grand jury investigation to determine if
the defendant's conduct only demonstrated "a mere careless shooting resulting in death" where the
defendant was indicted for criminal negligence for fatally shooting the victim while engaged in
hunting); State v. Jones, 126 A.2d 273 (Me. 1956) (finding instruction basing liability on civil
negligence rather than criminal negligence was prejudicial error where the defendant was convicted of
negligently and carelessly shooting and wounding a human being while hunting); People v. Dawson,
133 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dismissing the defendant's indictment for criminal negligence, after
killing a man while engaged in hunting, where the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
establish criminal negligence necessary to convict).
284. People v. McKee, 73 Cal. Rptr. 112 (Ct. App. 1968).
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based on an unnamed offense was set aside 8 5 Significantly, most of these non-
homicide charges actually arose from incidents involving fatalities.286
In almost half of the forty-three cases cited, prosecutors failed to obtain
convictions. Furthermore, in many of these cases, the charges arose from
circumstances not considered true hunting accidents. The prosecution did succeed
in a conviction for a serious offense, and the reviewing court affirmed in State v.
Scott,287 a decision from the Supreme Court of Appeals ofWest Virginia. However,
the incident proved not to be the result of a hunting accident. In that case, a
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder arising out of his fatal shooting
of another hunter. Defendant claimed the shooting was the result of a hunting
"accident" in that he mistook the victim for a squirrel. However, the evidence
revealed: (1) the defendant shot the victim on a Sunday-a day when hunting is
illegal in that state; (2) the shooting occurred in an area where hunting was illegal;
(3) the defendant had, in fact, not hunted for a period of one to two years prior to
the incident; (4) defendant had no hunting license; (5) several neighbors and
children had previously encountered defendant brandishing guns in an effort to
intimidate people from going on his property; (6) the defendant left the victim
behind after he shot him and returned to a neighbor's residence, where he became
very intoxicated; and (7) when an individual went to the site of the shooting to
determine what had occurred, defendant fired two shots in the direction of the
individual " . Here, then, the defendant simply used hunting to cover up a malicious
killing.289
The cool judicial response that prosecutors encounter only serves to aggravate
the spotty prosecutorial efforts. One illustration is in People v. Swygert," decided
by a New York County Court. In this case, the defendant was indicted for "criminal
negligence while engaged in hunting" arising out of his fatal shooting of another.'
The court granted the defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury's minutes to
inquire into the "serious question" as to whether evidence indicated that the
defendant "did more than a mere careless shooting which resulted in death" or
"something more than the negligence necessary to support a civil action. ..."-'
In People v. Joyce,29" another New York case, the defendant, thinking the
victim was a deer, fatally shot a hunter in another hunting party. State police
investigators found no deer tracks in the snow in the immediate vicinity where
police found the victim's body. Also, as a result of a morning storm, the trees were
heavily covered with snow. Numerous trees and small brush in the vicinity limited
the hunter's ability to see what might be in the background where he would shoot.
In any event, the defendant was indicted for manslaughter in the second degree.
Ultimately, the New York County Court noted that this offense required proof of
"culpable negligence," which the court felt was lacking.294 Thus, the court
dismissed the indictment.295
285. In re Mellott, 476 A.2d 11, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (reversing delinquency adjudication
where Miranda warnings were not given before interrogation).
286. Weber, 2000 WL 136782; Ivey, 474 S.E.2d 501; Mellott, 476 A.2d 11; Ferry, 267 N.Y.2d
649; Dawson, 133 N.Y.2d 423; Bogart, 259 N.Y.2d 351; Siiygert, 196 N.Y.2d 231; Smaka, 127
N.Y.2d 556.
287. 522 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1999) (per curiam).
288. Id. at 635.
289. Id.
290. 196 N.Y.S.2d 231(N.Y. County Ct. 1960).
291. Id. at 231.
292. Id. at 231, 232 (emphasis added).
293. 84 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. County Ct. 1948).
294. Id. at 242-44.
295. Id. at 245.
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Where courts upheld convictions in cases involving trae hunting incidents, the
reported sentences ranged from relatively lenient to very serious. In one Minnesota
case, the court affirmed a second-degree manslaughter conviction arising out of a
true hunting mishap and sentenced the defendant to five years probation. 6 Of the
three felony-murder convictions, all three offenders were sentenced to life
imprisonment.297 Seven of the nine opinions affirming involuntary manslaughter
convictions reported the imposed sentences. The first was a one-year suspended
sentence and a $100 fine;29t the second was a 365-day imprisonment and $11,793
in restitution; 99 the third was a suspended sentence of six months in jail and a
$1,000 fine;3" the fourthwas twelve months injail, with eight months suspended;3"'
the fifth was thirt-five years incarceration, suspended after nineteen years, and five
years probation;3 2the sixth sentence was seven years imprisonment for involuntary
manslaughter, one year for reckless use of a firearm, and a $500 fine for trespass;
3
0
3
and the seventh was three months in jail and a $1,000 fine.3s ' The only opinion
upholding negligent homicide did not report the sentence." 5 Of the four decisions
upholding careless or negligent hunting convictions, two reported the sentences.
Theywere: (1) one year injail and a $1,000 free;3'6 and (2) ninety days in jail with
work privileges.30 7 These two latter cases arose fromfatal shootings while hunting.
In Section II of this article, numerous examples of shooting reports, many fatal,
were the subject of no prosecution whatsoever. Evidence strongly suggests
prosecutorial oversight.30 0 In the instance of Karen Wood, 9 the grand jury refused
to indict the shooter, and a local columnist had the audacity to place blame on
Wood for wearing white mittens.3 ' The problem has gotten so far out of hand that,
in certain areas of the country, those who voice their opinions in confronting the
reckless practices of hunters are penalized.3 ' Bill Padgett, discussed in Section III,
was beaten after voicing his opinion that hunters should not partake in road
hunting.312 The lack of prosecution of hunting "accidents," as well as the
punishment for interference with hunting, has created an atmosphere of invincibility
296. State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1979).
297. Hines v. State, 578 S.E.2d 868,871 n. 1 (Ga. 2003); Chapman v. State, 467 S.E.2d 497,498
(Ga. 1996); Mainor v. State, 387 S.E.2d 882, 883 n.1 (Ga. 1990).
298. Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Ark. 1975).
299. People v. Cummings, 580 N.W.2d 480,481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
300. Gooden v. Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d 780, 781 (Va. 1984).
301. Cable v. Commonwealth, 415 S.E.2d 218, 219 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
302. State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847, 851 (Conn. 2001).
303. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the
convictions and thus the sentences for involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm, but
reversing the conviction and thus the sentence for trespass).
304. State v. Puryear, 590 P.2d 475, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
305. State v. Low, 635 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1993).
306. State v. Ivey, 474 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1996).
307. State v. Weber, No. 99-1571-CR, 2000 WL 136782, at *1 (Wisc. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000).
308. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text (referring to examples where no charges were
brought).
309. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
311. Not surprisingly, some states have laws criminalizing behavior that interferes "with [the]
lawful taking ofwild animals." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/2 (West 2003). Onemanwas sentenced
to nine months court supervision and fined $100 when he played loud music from his home during the
1998 deer season. The man claimed that he was concerned for the welfare of his family, as bullets
frequently fly over his home during deer season. Man Fined for Disturbing Deer Hunting, S-. J.R.E.G.
(Ill.), Sept. 28, 1999, at 11. Compare, 696 N.E.2d 1144 (111. 1998) (holding portion of Illinois Hunter
Interference Act, 720 ILL. COMP. SAT. ANN. 125/2 (West 2003), to be unconstitutional where it
prohibits speech in a manner that is not content-neutral.). The Illinois legislature has since amended the
statute. See 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN 125/2 (West 2003) (referring to 1994 and 1997 amendments).
312. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
2004]
39
Decker: Don't Forget to Wear Your Hunter Orange (or Flack Jacket): A Crit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for the hunter. In at least two instances, hunters may have relied on the lack of
prosecution in hunting accidents to conceal an intentional killing.
3 13
F. The Model: Prosecution via the "Reckless Hunter" Standard
Notwithstanding the earlier reports of reckless hunting that injured or killed
without ensuing criminal sanctions, instances exist in which prosecutors have
sought vigorously to convict reckless hunters. In Lawson v. Commonwealth,"4 a
hunter in Virginia was indicted for involuntary manslaughter, reckless use of a
firearm, and trespass by a hunter arising out of a hunting incident. The defendant
was hunting for turkey on private property when he saw turkey scratches on the
ground, heard a turkey call, and then saw and heard movement. At that point,
defendant fired his gun at the "movement."3 ' Defendant later stated that he saw a
"black object bobbing up and down" like a turkey that was feeding, but admitted
that he had not identified the object as a turkey." 6 The movement was actually that
of another hunter and his dog. Defendant's shot from his twelve-gauge shotgun
loaded with 00 shot killed them both." 7 At trial, the prosecution presented hunting
experts to attack the methods of the defendant who fired at movement without first
identifying the target.3"" The hunting experts explained that hunting regulations of
the State of Virginia require a hunter to first identify the target before shooting. The
State hunting manual says: "[D]o not shoot at sounds. You do not shoot at color.
You do not shoot before you have absolutely made certain that your target is what
you are shooting at, and that the background is such that if you miss you're not
going to do other damage."3"9 When asked how much of a turkey a hunter must see
before he shoots at it, the experts testified, "All of it."32 Here, then, the testimony
of the hunting experts developed the standard expected of the reasonable hunter by
demonstrating that the reasonable hunter would not have shot at sound but would
have clearly identified the target before firing.321
Ultimately, the Lawson court affirmed the defendant'sinvoluntary manslaughter
and reckless use of a firearm convictions. 322 The defendant was sentenced to seven
years incarceration for the involuntary manslaughter and twelve months
incarceration for the reckless use of a firearm323  Upon review, the Virginia
appellate court affirmed these two convictions.324
In Cable v. Commonwealth,325 another Virginia appellate decision, reliance on
expert testimony aided the State in gaining a criminal conviction where a hunter
fatally shot a hunting companion. Similar to Lawson, the defendant saw a "flash of
313. Twenty years after the fact, a doctor was convicted in 1996 for murdering his friend in what
was previously considered a hunting accident. See Twisted Thinking: The State Superior Court Has
Tossed out a Murder Conviction. Hopefully the Supreme Court Will Overturn This Bizarre Ruling,
SUNDAYNEWS (Lancaster, Pa.), May 7, 2000, atP-2, available at LEXIS, News Library, Sunnws File.
See also Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 2002) (discussing the eventually successful
prosecution of this doctor).
314. 547 S.E.2d 513 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
315. Id. at 514-15.
316. Id. at 515.
317. Id. at 514-15.
318. Id. at514.
319. Id.
320. Lawson v. Commissioner, 547 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 519. A conviction for criminal trespass by hunter was reversed on insufficiency of
evidence grounds. Id. at 515-16.
323. Id. at 514.
324. Id. at 519.
325. 405 S.E.2d 444 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
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movement," which he thought was a squirrel.326 Instead, it was his companion, who
was nearby in thick underbrush. At the defendant's trial on charges of involuntary
manslaughter, a hunting safety expert testified that the established safety rule is, as
a hunter, you must "'always be sure of your target and what is behind it before you
fire."'"27 Since that the defendant realized at least one other person was in the
vicinity when he fired his gun at an "unidentified target," which was "in utter
disregard of the safety of others," the court found that his conduct amounted to
recklessness and, as such, affirmed his manslaughter conviction.328
In People v. Cummings,3 9 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a Michigan
appellate court decision33 and reinstated a conviction for involuntary manslaughter
where the evidence revealed that the defendant had fatally shot the victim he
believed was a deer.33' At the defendant's trial, the evidence revealed that he fired
his gun in the "dark ' 332 "one hour before sunrise. '3 3 The State of Michigan relied
on the fact that defendant's pre-dawn shooting violated a Michigan Department of
Natural Resources regulation that explicitly prohibited shooting before sunrise, and
the trial judge instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if it
determined that the defendant failed to exercise the "ordinary care" expected of the
"reasonable person" in such a hunting situation.334
In State v. Perfetto,335 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirnmed a
conviction of manslaughter arising out of defendant's fatal shooting of his deer
hunting companion.336 The court stated that where, as here, a hunter fires "his
weapon without knowing at what he was firing," his conduct constitutes "'a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would
observe in the same situation,"' thereby qualifying any such fatal shooting as
manslaughter. 37 The Maine court emphasized that any reasonable hunter should
know that "[ilnnumerable Maine citizens take to our woods during hunting season
to hunt deer," and "[m]any visitors" are present for the same reason:
It is not an exaggeration to state that during hunting season there is
virtually an army in the Maine woods. Under such circumstances, a hunter
who fires a deadly weapon at a sound or at a sight without being certain at
what he is shooting has grossly deviated from the standard of conduct of
a reasonable and prudent person. The reasonable and prudent hunter will
bear the risk of loss of legitimate prey to avoid the risk of the destruction
of human life.
338
326. Id. at 445.
327. Id. at 445.
328. Id. at 446.
329. 585 N.W.2d 299 (Mich. 1998).
330. People v. Cummings, 580 N.W.2d 480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam), rev'd, 585
N.W.2d 299 (Mich. 1998).
331. Id. at482.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 483.
334. Id.
335. 424 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
336. Id. at 1097.
337. Id. at 1098 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 10(3)(C), (4)(C) (year omitted in
case)).
338. Id.
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Perfetto, like Dawson, Cable, and Cummings, makes it abundantly clear that a
prosecution's evidentiary showing of a breach of hunting standards may translate
into a basis for criminal sanctions. 39
Each of these cases should serve as models to demonstrate how prosecutors can
utilize hunting regulations to develop a "reasonable hunter" standard and then
establish through expert testimony the breaches of that standard by the reckless
hunter, who faces criminal charges. Given the fact that state DNR agencies publish
manuals, conduct hunter training classes, and make extensive efforts to alert hunters
to the dangers of the sport, it is virtually impossible for an irresponsible hunter to
claim that his or her conduct in endangering life or limb constituted what the law
defines as a true accident.
G. The Evolution of Modern Criminal Law: Prosecutorial Responses to
Other Types of Reckless Conduct
The legal field has yet to develop a body of law in which prosecution of
reckless hunting "incidents" is routine. This area of law, or lack thereof, has failed
to evolve according to changes in societal pressures and thinking. In fact, the legal
field has demonstrated its capability of adapting to changing social norms and ideas
by either modifying previous laws or prosecuting previously ignored crimes.
Within the last two decades, progressive advances have occurred to address, for
example: (1) domestic violence, (2) child abuse, (3) dog marblings, and (4) violence
in sports. Brief comments about each of these areas follow.
Less than thirty years ago, domestic violence was traditionally considered a
private, family matter and not a criminal act.340 However, with the assistance of
domestic abuse law reformers, the misconceptions that historically surrounded
domestic abuse began to dissipate, and domestic abuse law evolved into what it is
today.3"' Yet, in order to bring about such a revolution in the law, reformers faced
many obstacles, including the police and prosecutorial policies of "non-intervention
and selective non-enforcement" of criminal laws where violence occurred within
the family.342 One of the first obstacles reformers in the 1970s faced was
overhauling domestic abuse law, because much of the law of that time was designed
to make an arrest (let alone a prosecution) of a batterer extremely unlikely.' For
339. In a case involving the defendant's careless and negligent shooting of another turkey hunter,
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas remarked:
Because of the hazards involved in seeking out the friendly fowl, ordinary care
would require that a turkey hunter first see the fowl before firing. If a hunter
merely hears a distant gobble or sees a furtive movement in the thicket, he may
not in safety discharge his fowling piece without further finding that he is
shooting at his game and not at a gentleman gamester engaged in like pursuit.
There is surely a risk involved in firing through thick brush at what one perceives
to be a turkey, without further identifying a turkey's head, wattles, beak, hackles,
blade, breast, sickle feathers, hock or claw which gives the hunter some clue that
he is about to dispatch a friendly turkey and not a fellow traveler employed in
kindred activity.
Commonwealth v. Padelsky, 6 Pa. D. & C. 4th 642, 645 (Pa. C.P. 1990) (dismissing defendant's
petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein defendant claimed Commonwealth failed to establish prima
facie evidence of violation of prohibition against "shooting at or causing injury to another human
being").
340. Christine O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence, No-Contact Orders and theAutonomy Rights
of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937-38 (1999).
341. Id. at 938-39.
342. Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceputualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence:
Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593, 596 (1999).
343. Id- at 597.
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example, domestic violence during this period generally was considered a
misdemeanor, and a police officer did not have the right to make an arrest unless the
abuse occurred in the officer's presence. Consequently, because most incidents of
domestic abuse did not occur in the officer's presence, an officer seldom had the
authority to make an arrest.3" Reformers, therefore, rallied the legislature to change
the law so an officer could make a warrantless arrest when he had probable cause
to believe that domestic violence had occurred.345 As a result of these efforts, all
fifty states now provide that, in cases of domestic violence, a police officer can
make a warrantless arrest. 3"
Reformers also pointed out that most prosecutors did not ascribe the same level
of importance to domestic abuse cases as they did other crimes.347 In fact, for a
variety of tenuous reasons, many prosecutors often refused to pursue domestic
abuse cases and encouraged victims of domestic abuse not to press charges against
their batterers.348 Reformers, recognizing that prosecutors played a significant role
in enforcing the law, encouraged legislatures to enact regulations to promote
aggressive prosecution in domestic abuse cases.349 The aggressive prosecution
tactics included mandatory arrest, mandatory prosecution, and mandatory no-contact
orders.3"' A majority of the states now utilize these tactics in some manner. t The
"battered woman syndrome" reflects another legal protection afforded the abused
woman. This syndrome allows a battered woman who has killed or injured her
domestic batterer to explain through expert opinion the reasonableness of her
perception that her batterer posed an inuinent and life-threatening danger and
effectively allows a battered woman to plead self-defense when she is prosecuted.3"2
In addition to the changes in the law and prosecutorial policy, other developments
further changed the legal response to domestic violence. Some examples of these
changes include creating prosecution teams that specialize in domestic abuse,
creating state-funded shelters for victims of domestic abuse, reforming laws dealing
with orders of protection, improving a victim's access to emergency restraining
orders, and enhancing a domestic abuse victim's options for relief.35 3 All of these
efforts have given domestic violence a new priority as a crime as well as a matter
of critical public significance.354
Although child abuse and neglect have been recognized as a problem since the
late nineteenth century, widespread efforts to intervene in homes where the abuse
and neglect occurred did not surface until the 1960s and 1970s. 3" For example, in
1961, a survey of 88 hospitals found 305 children who had been physically battered,
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 598-99.
348. Mangum, supra note 342, at 599.
349. O'Connor, supra note 340, at 942.
350. Id. at 942-47.
351. Id.
352. Melanie Frager Griffith, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64
FORDHAm L. REV. 141, 143-44 (1995).
353. Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements
on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1290-91 (2000); see also Elaine Chiu,
Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1223-24 (2001)
("[mprovements include legislation authorizing warrantless arrests in domestic violence
misdemeanors, increased numbers of shelters for battered women... and more sensitive custody rules
in family courts.").
354. Study: Domestic Violence Should be Treated as Global Health Problem, CNN.com,
available at http://www.cnn.com20OO/US/Ol/20/women.violence.02/ (Jan. 20, 2000) (noting that
cultural attitudes regarding domestic violence have changed in U.S.).
355. Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse Registries at the Inter-
section of Child Protection. Due Process, and Equal Protection, II TEX. J. WOMEN& L. 1, 5-8 (2001).
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often by a parent or foster parent.356 While this study brought about much needed
legislative response, the child protection laws were short-sighted in their focus,
namely, in only requiring the reporting of suspected child abuse.357 The assumption
was that if abused children were identified, the appropriate social service agency
would intervene, but, in fact, much abuse and mistreatment was not addressed.3"
Indeed, "in 1987 more than eleven hundred children died from abuse, a twenty-five
percent increase in two years."'359 The primary causes of these deaths appear to have
been shaken baby syndrome, suffocation, and beatings.36 Depictions of abuse
caused some legislatures to reevaluate child abuse laws and rethink the
policies-including those of prosecutorial authorities-that historically surrounded
those laws.36' As a result, both mandatory child abuse reporting laws and laws
specifically criminalizing child abuse were passed,362 and child protection agencies
were created. 63 In addition, a growing sensitivity now exists regarding the
propriety of corporal punishment of a child.3  Moreover, where such corporal
punishment is extreme, the child will probably be removed from the home,3 and
the parent will be prosecuted for some form of battery.36
More recently, the American criminal justice system has become cognizant of
not only intentional bodily injury inflicted on children, but also physical abuse that
is not the result of deliberate infliction of harm. Today, many states have
prosecuted the acts of abusive parents or guardians whose infants suffered shaken-161
baby syndrome. Consider an impatient parent or guardian who becomes frustrated
with a crying infant, and as an attempt to stop the child's crying, shakes the baby,
rather than attending to its needs. Tragically, this shaking can severely harm the
infant. In particular, the shaking can injure the infant's developing brain, causing
356. Id. at 6-7.
357. Id. at 7.
358. Id. at 7-8.
359. Lorene Feuerbach Schaefer, Comment, Abused Children and State-Created Protection
Agencies: A Proposed Section 1983 Standard, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1419, 1419 (1989).
360. Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 535, 542-50 (1999).
361. Shaefer, supra note 359, at 1419-20.
362. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-21.6 (West 2002) (making it unlawful to
"willfully cause or permit the life or health of a child under the age of 18 to be endangered or to
willfully cause or permit a child to be placed in circumstances that endanger the child's life or health").
This offense, called "endangering the life or health of a child," was enacted in Illinois in 1993. See id.
5/12-21.6 (providing the effective date of the original bill as September 9, 1993).
363. Schaefer, supra note 359, at 1441.
364. See. e.g., Karen Brandon, Taped Beating Renews Debate over Spanking, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
25, 2002, § i, at I (discussing mother's beating of child caught on Mishawaka, Indiana store security
camera). This spectacle, where Madelyne Toogood was seen repeatedly hitting her four-year-old
daughter, not only was repeatedly played on TV news stories but also earned Ms. Toogood a conviction
for battery and a one year term of probation. Mother in Taped Beating Gets Probation, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
15, 2003, § 1, at 13.
365. See. e.g., In re A.W., No. 01-1445, 2002 WL 1973910 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (finding that
a child was properly removed following excessive corporal punishment).
366. See, e.g., People v. Sambo, 554 N.E.2d 1080, 1084-85 (i1. App. Ct. 1990) (upholding trial
court denial ofjury instructions on parental justification based on corporal punishment and finding a
proper conviction of battery where two parents hit their child "with their hands, a plastic baseball bat,
and a belt, kicked her, threw liquor in her face, and pulled her hair").
367. See, e.g., Art Barnum, Dad Gets 9 Years for Violently Shaking Son, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6,
2004, at § 2, at 6 (noting that the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery of a child). See also
Steve Salvatore, M.D., Shaking a Baby Can Disable-or Even Kill, CNN.com, available at
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9710/3 I/shaken.baby/ (Oct. 31, 1997).
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retinal hemorrhages.36 When the child survives, shaken baby syndrome is often the
cause of brain damage to the child.369 The law has responded to this problem by
using the existing criminal law3 70 to actively prosecute those who abuse a helpless
infant in this manner.3 7 ' In the case of an infant's death, a successful prosecution
for murder is a real possibility today.3"2
Another example of appropriate prosecutorial response to wrongdoing
previously ignored by prosecutorial authorities involves enforcement of criminal
laws against dog owners whose dogs injure innocent bystanders.373 Perhaps the
most widely publicized example occurred in 2001 when two dogs weighing over
one hundred pounds each mauled and killed a thirty-three-year-old woman.374
Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel, who cared for the dogs, both were convicted of
manslaughter, for which they now face the maximum four-year sentence of
imprisonment.7 Evidence suggested the couple knew that the Presa Canario dogs
were vicious, and yet, the sentencing judge pointed out that they "knowingly
inserted into society two massive, dangerous and uncontrollable dogs. 376
In 2002, in Mauston, Wisconsin, a young girl was visiting a friend in the
defendant's home when the defendant's six Rottweiler dogs attacked and killed
her.377 The Chicago Tribune reported that the youngster had been petting one of the
dogs when her young friend heard her screams for help.378 No adults were in the
home at the time of the attack.379 Following investigation of the girl's death, the
defendant faced charges of homicide caused by a vicious animal."' Later, the
defendant pleaded no contest to recklessly causing harm to a child and child
neglect, and he was ordered to serve two years in prison.3"'
In 2000, in Brown County, Indiana, a seventy-one-year-old female census
worker's body was found lifeless immediately outside the home of the defendants,
368. Joseph Hatina, Note, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Who are the Experts?, 46 CLEV. ST.L. REV.
557, 561-63 (1998).
369. See, e.g., People v. Renteria, 597 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (describing how
"shaken baby syndrome" caused child to suffer severe brain damage).
370. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.3 (West 2002) (criminalizing the acts on any
person over the age of eighteen who intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm or permanent
disfigurement to a child under the age of thirteen).
371. See, e.g., People v. Renteria, 597 N.E.2d 714,720 (Ill App. Ct. 1992) (finding the defendant
guilty of aggravated battery of a child when the defendant shook a two-and-a-half-month-old baby with
such force as to cause brain damage to the child).
372. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 724 N.E.2d 967, 973-75 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that
evidence supported defendants conviction for first-degree murder where eleven-month-old child died
of multiple injuries, including shaken baby syndrome).
373. According to a 1993 estimate, between 500,000 and I million dog bites are reported
nationally to health authorities each year. Jolie Pollets, SPCA Tries to Curb Guard-Dog Adoption, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE (La.), July 22, 1993, at 4A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nolpic File.
374. Susan Richter, Murder, Manslaughter Charges Issued in California DogAttack, CNN.com
(2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/27/dog.mauling.arrests/ (Mar. 27, 2001)
(noting that Knoller and Noel, both attorneys, were holding the dogs for an individual, a California
prison inmate, who allegedly ran an illegal attack dog ring for drug dealers).
375. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Unrepentant Knoller Gets Maximum Term; 4- Year Prison Term in
S.F. Dog-Mauling Case, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2002, at A], available at LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn
File.
376. Id.; see also Evelyn Nieves, Woman Gets 4-Year Term in Fatal Dog Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2002, at AS, available at LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
377. Dog Owner Gets 2 Years in Girl's Death, CHi. TRIB., June 28, 2003, at 15, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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who initially denied ownership of any of the dogs.382  However, authorities
discovered that the couple had maintained a pack of dogs for several years, and they
had knowledge that the dogs had been involved in several other non-fatal attacks. 3
Later, the dog owners pled guilty to the charge of criminal recklessness with a
deadly weapon, after which the male defendant was given a three-year sentence, and
his longtime female companion received eighteen months in prison.
38 4
A final example of vigorous prosecution of existing criminal laws against the
owner of a dangerous animal occurred following a 1997 incident in Geary County,
Kansas, when two young brothers were waiting for their school bus. Three
Rottweiler dogs ran out of the yard of a neighboring home and attacked one of the
two brothers, an eleven-year-old boy. The attack crushed the boy's spinal cord and
severed his carotid artery and jugular vein.3"5 The county sheriff reported that the
young boy was probably dead within two minutes of the attack. 6 Following trial,
a jury took less than three hours to find one of the two dog owners guilty of
unintentional second-degree murder,387 for which she received a sentence of over
twelve years. 8 The second owner, the husband of the woman convicted of murder,
entered a no contest plea to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to five
years probation.389
In recent years, some prosecutors have used existing criminal laws in the world
of sports to curb heinous acts.390 Some argue that most contact sports by their very
nature involve the specter of possible serious injury and, as such, that prosecutorial
meddling into the worst case scenario sports incident will cause players to be less
382. Pack of Dogs at Rural Home Kills Woman Trying to Collect Census Data; Deputies Find
More Than 20 Dogs on the Property, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 2000, at A3, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Slpd File.
383. George Stuteville, Woman Tells of Killer Dogs' Vicious Attack on Mother; Brown County
Judge Is Urged to Give Pets" Owners Maximum Sentence, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 6, 2001, at 6D,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Indyst File.
384. George Stuteville, Maximum Terms Stun Couple; Judge Gives Jail Time to Owners ofDogs
That Killed a Census Worker as She Made Rounds, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 7, 2001, at I B, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Indyst File.
385. 3 Dogs Killed Boy within Minutes, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), Apr. 26, 1997, at 51,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Omwhld File.
386. Id.
387. Dogs' Owner Found Guilty of Murder in Death of Boy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1998, § 1, at
11, available at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
388. Quotes of the Day, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1998, at 2 (quoting juror Donald Baker as saying,
"she got what she deserved").
389. Matt Moline, Owner in FatalRottweiler Case Gets Probation, TOPEKACAPITAL-JOURNAL (Kan.),
Apr. 2, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Topkcj File. Although this author believes existing laws
are sufficient to address the human carnage caused by vicious dogs and other dangerous animals, it should
be noted that some legislators have recommended increased penalties for dogs that maim or kill. See, e.g.,
Joel Daly, Services Held for Victim in Fatal Dog Attack: Alderman Proposes Stricter Ordinance,
ABC7Chicago.com, available at http://abclocal.go.comwls/news_011603_ns dogattacks.html (discussing
Chicago aldennan's proposal to increase penalties from $1,000 fine and two-year prison term for one's dog
causing severe injury or death to a $10,000 fine and a five-year prison term). In New Orleans, for example,
a dog may be declared "dangerous" by a court if it tries to attack and bite and causes some harm to another
animal or human, thereby requiring owner compliance with strict guidelines to keep the animal in an enclosed
chain-linked kennel run and the owner's purchase of a $250,000 liability insurance policy. Pollets, supra note
373, at 4A1.
390. See generally Charles Harary, Aggressive Play or Criminal Assault? An In Depth Look at
Sports Violence and Criminal Liability, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 197 (2002) (analyzing the law on
violence in sports and arguing for heightened enforcement of existing laws in cases of violence).
[Vol. 56: 135
46
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss1/5
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF HUNTING "ACCIDENTS"
competitive and the game less appealing.39' The reality, however is that some legal
gains have been made to curb unnecessary violence in sports. 39 In one case, an
ugly incident erupted in 2000 in Reading, Massachusetts, between the defendant
and the supervisor of a youth hockeypractice after someone's elbow came close to
breaking the defendant's son's nose. 3 When the defendant yelled at the victim to
stop the rough play that apparently continued, the defendant stormed onto the ice
and engaged the victim in a brutal fistfight that resulted in the death of the victim.394
Subsequently, the defendant was prosecuted and convicted of involuntary
manslaughter9 . and given a prison sentence of six to ten years.396
In 2002, an on-ice hockey incident resulted in criminal prosecution of Boston
Bruins National Hockey League player Marty McSorley.397 The defendant
McSorley, who apparently had a reputation as a "fighter," hit a Vancouver Canucks
player so hard in the head with a hockey stick that he caused the player to suffer a
severe concussion. British Columbia authorities prosecuted McSorley for assault
with a deadly weapon.39 Following his trial, McSorley was convicted and
sentenced to eighteen months of probation. 99
Another on-ice incident was enough to prosecute even a high school hockey_
player for unnecessary rough play that caused permanent injury to another player.
4
In Illinois, a sixteen-year-old high school hockey player was sentenced to two years
probation after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor battery arising out of an after-the-
buzzer cross-check that left a fifteen-year-old opponent permanentlyparalyzed from
the waist down.4"'
As with reckless hunting, the extent of violence in sports is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure.40 2 More importantly, as with endangerment of life and limb
as a result of hunting, the type of human carnage that occurs in the world of sports
would diminish in a most dramatic way if participants abided by the rules and if
those who did not were tolerated.
The extent to which the criminal justice system has recognized the profound
importance ofprotecting innocent citizens against the dangers of domestic violence,
child abuse, lethal dogs, and even violence in sports is largely a result of
prosecutorial willingness to engage in the vigorous enforcement of those laws
already on the books. This author believes that injuries that occur as a result of
hunting incidents should also be addressed with the same degree of urgency.
391. See Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the
Professional Sports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?, 6 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 127, 141-
42 (1996) (suggesting that historically little prosecution attention has been given to violence in sports
because of such concern).
392. Id. at 166.
393. Mourners Attend Funeralfor Father Killed in Hockey Rink Fight: Defendant Claims Self-
Defense, Freed on Bail, CNN.com, July 11, 2000, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/07/11 /hockey. fight.02/index.htmnl.
394. Id.
395. Fox Butterfield, Man Convicted in Fatal Beating in Dispute at Son's Hockey Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at Al.
396. Fox Butterfield, Father in Killing at Hockey Rink is Given Sentence of 6 to 10 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at AI.
397. Gary Tuclunan, Hockey Player Goes on Trial for an On-Ice Assault, CNN.com, Sept. 26,
2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/criminallO9/25/mcsorley.trial.02/.
398. Id.
399. Jack Thompson, McSorley: IDidn 't Want Trial to Hurt NHL, Become 'Circus', CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 10, 2000, Sports §N, at 2.
400. Runmnana Hussain, Probation For Teen Who Delivered Hockey Hit, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27,
2000, at 1.
401. Id.
402. Harary, supra, note 390, at 197.
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset, this Article described a significant number of incidents in which
careless hunters have killed, injured, or nearly injured innocent people. In addition,
this Article demonstrated the relative lack of serious prosecution of reckless
shootings in the hunting context and identified the hunting culture as a possible
source of the problem that can often influence the decision not to prosecute. This
author makes no attempt to promote the passage of new laws for the prosecution of
hunting "accidents." Instead, this Article advocates that prosecutors should use
existing laws to enforce the crimes committed by reckless hunters in the same
manner as prosecutors use these laws against careless shooters outside the context
of hunting. The suggested prosecutorial model provides a structure for prosecutors
to follow: prosecutors should identify the standard of care of the reasonable hunter
that invariably appears in each jurisdiction's hunting regulations, and then-in
connection with the actual prosecution of a criminal hunter-prosecutors should
demonstrate the breach of the standard of care by the hunter being prosecuted.
To conclude, this Article is not a challenge to the morality of hunting, nor is it
advocating gun control laws. Its purpose is to promote prosecution of the reckless
hunter. Indeed, this approach is to the advantage of the ethical hunter because it
will lead to the removal of the dangerous hunter from the hunting setting. Also, the
prosecution of the reckless hunter will create a safer environment for those who live
in hunting areas. As a result of the effective prosecution of so-called hunting
"accidents," hunting will become a safer and more enjoyable activity for all those
directly and indirectly involved.
In closing, this author borrows several passages from a Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas opinion, penned by the Honorable Judge Dolbin. The case involved
one hunter shooting another turkey hunter in the face, with the former immediately
telling the latter (who suffered some type of injury but survived), "'I'm sorry, I
thought you were a turkey.'4 3 When charged with careless or neglient "shooting
at or causing injury to another human being while hunting game,"' the defendant
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contending that the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania had failed to establish a prima facie case of violation of the relevant
statute." 5 Rather poetically, the court's opinion begins:
A hunter on his quest for game,
Must see a bird and then take aim.
For if he shoots sans diligence
He'll answer for his negligence." 6
In dismissing the defendant's request for charge dismissal, the court declared:
We believe the law is reasonable enough to require that
reasonable men act reasonably in the bush as in business, in the
forest as by their fireside and in the hills as in their homes.
To discharge a deadly weapon at a distant target without
identifying the object fired upon is to risk death or disabling and
painful injury to a fellow nimrod. The sport of hunting is a grand
outdoor adventure engaged in by millions of our citizens. If those
who take up the sport disregard the risk involved, then calamity
403. Commonwealth v. Padelsky, 6 Pa. D. & C. 4th 642, 643 (Pa. C.P. 1990).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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will cause chaos and careless crackshots will cause corpses and
cadavers to cover the countryside. 47
Amen!
407. Id. at 646.
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